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Introduction
The jurisdictional reality of the system of international criminal law is
rapidly developing within the international legal and political community.1
The states of the world have recently shown a willingness for the pragmatic
implementation and attribution of the provisions of international criminal
law to those who commit international crimes. 2 This development can be
seen in United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolu-
tions, behind which the voice of the most militarily and politically strong
states is conveying the whole machinery of the implementation of the sys-
tem of international criminal law.3 This can particularly be examined in
the development of the law of international criminal tribunals, such as the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)4 and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR). 5 Neither of the Tribunals could have been established without the
direct military participation of the United States. 6 More recently, the Iraqi
Special Tribunal (IST) for the prosecution and punishment of Saddam Hus-
sein was established. The Tribunal has a temporary function and has juris-
diction over the former president of Iraq. The judicial legal validity of the
Tribunal is, however, one of the most serious questions facing the interna-
l. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD
PEACE (1980); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, NEw LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR GLOBAL SURVIVAL,
SECURITY THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL (1993);JOHN R.W.D. JONES & STEVEN POWLES,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE (2003); LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1998).
2. See, e.g., Farhad Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility, in 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 153 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999); Antonio Cassese, On the Cur-
rent Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 4-5, 9 (1998); Antonio Cassese, Reflections on
International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1998).
3. See FA- Ar MALEKIAN, CONDEMNING THE USE OF FORCE IN THE GULF CRISIS (1994).
4. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, May 25,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/stat-
ute.html [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
5. See The Situation Concerning Rwanda: Establishment of an International Tribu-
nal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994); see also
David J. Scheffer, International Judicial Intervention, 1996 FOREIGN POL'Y 34 (discussing
the Rwandan genocide).
6. Regarding the establishment of international criminal tribunals, Sterling John-
son has stated:
International goals are only realized through national self-interests. Presently,
international justice is not universally perceived to be in the interests of many
nation-states and thereby exists in only a piecemeal fashion. Some states are
punished while others are not. States help one another in particular circum-
stances .... This is evidenced by the U.N. Security Council's establishment of
International Criminal Tribunals to prosecute war criminals in Bosnia and
Rwanda, and the international community's approval of such measures.
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tional legal community. These concerns are particularly more serious
when one considers the judicial proceedings of other international crimi-
nal tribunals or courts including the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 the ICTY, and the ICTR. In this arti-
cle, I examine whether from a historical, contemporary, and prospective
approach to the system of international criminal law concerning the prose-
cution and punishment of individuals, the proceedings of the IST over Sad-
dam Hussein are consistent with the basic philosophy of the prosecution of
heads of state in international criminal law. The purpose of this academic
article is not to protect the criminals or the former dictator of Iraq from
prosecution and punishment under a national criminal jurisdiction, but to
see whether the laws of the tribunal reflect the basic foundations of inter-
national criminal justice, as stated repeatedly in the Charter of the United
Nations and international human rights instruments, as well as the Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 8 The main goal within the
international criminal justice system is not the implementation of the
rules, norms, and provisions of the system, but to achieve the essence of
these rules in a scale of justice that can be balanced against each substance
with the same standard of weight and measure. This means equality before
the law for all without any discrimination, which not only includes the
ordinary individuals of all states but also the heads of state of the world. In
other words, if the system of international criminal law applies in accor-
dance with one of the principles of jurisdiction such as the principle of
universality, the principle of territoriality, the principle of passive personal-
ity, the principle of flag, the principle of internationality, the principle of
international tribunality of jurisdiction, or any other principle, this applica-
tion must, in all parts of the world, be employed in all appropriate cases
without regard to the juridical or political strength of the heads of the rele-
vant states. When the system of international criminal law is applied to
individuals who have committed illegal acts, all relevant provisions con-
cerning those crimes including the proceedings, prosecution, and punish-
ment should be applied. This is what I call the complete application of the
principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction over persons accused of
committing international crimes.9 I have organized my arguments under
STERLING JOHNSON, PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE 82 (2003).
7. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by an Agreement between
the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1315. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html.
8. The Preamble of the Rome Statute maintains that the States Parties to the Statute
"[riesolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice."
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Stat-
ute]. The Preamble of the United Nations Charter also has a similar formulation. U.N.
Charter pmbl.
9. This principle is a comprehensive aspect of the principle of complementary to
national criminal jurisdiction.
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the above principle. 10 I introduced the principle for the first time at the
Cornell International Law Journal Symposium in spring 2005. 1 hope that
the principle will be developed by all means in international legal systems
for the purpose of implementation of a true international criminal justice
system in the world.
I. The Principles of the Criminal Justice System
Justice is the matter of understanding and the very question of give
and take on an equal basis. It is the philosophy of reciprocity, mutual
respect, and proportionality. 1 It is on the whole meant to regulate the
relationship of states with one another. 12 In the system of international
criminal law, justice is the contour between the actual acts of a person on
one side and the understanding of the act by the international legal com-
munity on the other side. This side may include the ICC or a tribunal that
will enforce certain provisions of international criminal law. The function
of the court or the tribunal is to examine the conditions and the circum-
stances of a given case, to judge the acts of the accused person in accor-
dance with the existing law, and to find out whether or not the acts violate
the governing international criminal regulations. The final duty of the tri-
bunal is thus to arrive at a reasonable understanding of the rules of inter-
national criminal law, apply them to a given case, and if the person is
found guilty of committing an international crime, impose an appropriate
punishment. The principles of international criminal justice are thus those
principles of the system of criminal law that must be respected in the exam-
ination of a given case and should not be selected or ignored by the
tribunal.
Two of the most important principles of justice are the principle of de
lege lata and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Respect for these
principles is vital for the basic structure of international criminal law. A
brief analysis of these principles, as well as the effect of a selective interna-
tional criminal justice system is necessary when considering the way in
which the 1ST will administer international criminal law.
A. The Problem of Selective Criminal Justice
The theory of justice, as the drafters of international rules, obligations,
and norms have supposed, does not normally function appropriately. The
10. For an analysis of the principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction see infra
Part VI.D.
11. See generally Brian Barry, Justice as Reciprocity, in JusTiCE 50 (Eugene Kamenka
& Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1980) (discussing the theory of justice as reciprocity and its
limitations); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (discussing
the principles and theories of justice, and the values it promotes).
12. FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FORMATION, TREATIES,
RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1987); see also MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Max
Sorensen ed., 1968); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1984); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1998);
Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995); RoSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW TO USE IT (1994).
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reason for this is that the international criminal system lacks a central
international organization aimed at solving its theoretical issues and con-
flicts, in contrast to the national criminal system.' 3 The international con-
flicts are, therefore, sometimes very intensive and dangerous. The most
common forms of these conflicts appear as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, apartheid, torture, terrorism, aggression, and in most
cases crimes against the humanitarian law of armed conflict. 1 4 Due to this
primary concept of international justice that can appear in international
relations of states, justice is considered by some to be weak, inconvenient,
and selective. 15 It is this selection of justice or the violation of equality
within the terms of international conventional norms or the international
criminal social contract that creates conflict. 16 Examples of the selection
of justice can be seen in the structure of the United Nations, which
presents in its Security Council a clear example of monopolization of inter-
national justice. 1 7 Another clear instance is the IST and the selection of
appropriate international criminal norms under the authority and supervi-
sion of the United States government. 18
In the case of the IST, the principles of justice, which should have
rested upon a theoretical foundation and legality, are based instead on the
burdens of military strength. 19 Thus, it will be difficult in practice to con-
vince an outsider who expects justice to be fair and equal. Consequently,
the role of justice is not effective. This is because we have a picture of a
minimum standard of justice in our theoretical perspective that must be
respected at all times. In other words, there is an international society
within which every state accepts that the same basic principles of interna-
tional norms are applicable to every other state and that they are all equal
before the law and the international legal system. They can neither modify
the rules by their own will nor ignore them. This is a rule that we generally
believe in. The concept of international justice denotes the existence of a
common point of view between states for the maintenance of international
peace and solving of international conflicts from different aspects of the
law. But when the concept of justice as fairness is selected and monopo-
lized by some states, views of many states and individuals may be
13. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 680-82
(2003); FARHAD MALEKIAN, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGAL AND CRITICAL ANALY-
SIS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 23 (1991).
14. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 13, at 121-24.
15. See JEAN ALLAIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CLOSER TO POWER THAN
JUSTICE 1 (2004); see also Jean Aflain, Orientalism and International Law: The Middle East
as the Underclass of the International Legal Order, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 391, 392 (2004);
Robert Cryer, The Boundaries of Liability in International Criminal Law, or 'Selectivity by
Stealth', 6 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3, 3-6 (2001).
16. ALLAIN, supra note 15, at 1, 12.
17. FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE MONOPOLIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
UNITED NATIONS: A JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACH 95-97 (1995).
18. See SABY GHOSHRAY, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN THE IRAQI SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE, JURISDICTION AND LEGITIMACY OF THE PROPOSED
LEGAL FRAMEWORK (2004), http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2004/Ghoshray.pdf.
19. Id. at 9.
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modified.20
One can find different conceptions of the term "justice" with different
degrees and values in international criminal law.21 All these concepts have
been developed through many centuries and resulted in different interpre-
tations.22 They have, in fact, left different concepts of justice in the juris-
prudence of international criminal law. 23 Obviously, various concepts of
justice do not solve the problems of international criminal law.24 While in
some cases, they may temporarily solve international conflicts arising
between states, in most instances, when justice is not done, armed con-
flicts are indeed unavoidable. One of the reasons for the conflicts is that a
characteristic set of elements for assigning the fundamental rights, duties,
and obligations arising from the institute of international criminal justice
or international social cooperation which is acceptable to all states without
any due regard to their size and strength is lacking. For example, the
framework of the ICC, although promising, rests obviously on the military
strength of the United States.25 In other words, it is up to the United States
to accept or reject the implementation of certain rules concerning the appli-
cation of criminality to the acts of certain individuals under the machinery
of the ICC.
We should remember that international criminal justice must always
have something in common so that the fundamental principle of interna-
tional social relations can be accepted by all nations. In other words, it is
the proper distribution of the principles of justice which brings us closer to
peace. One should remember, however, that even the proper distribution
of justice might not bring peace. The concept of fair and proper justice
does not occur by the formulation and selection of norms, provisions, and
rules of international conventions alone. Obviously, the term "peace"
means nothing more than to leave aside arbitrary decisions and distinc-
tions that are made between states and their citizens. It is usually our dis-
trust of the principles of international criminal justice that leads to
hostility and suspicion. A proper justice system surely introduces a proper
international balance between all states and creates international legal
trust and stability for the appropriate application of the norms of interna-
tional criminal law in an international criminal court.
20. Id. at 14.
21. See BAsslouNI, supra note 13, at 673.
22. Id. at 684-85.
23. Id. at 685.
24. Different schools of thought, namely the naturalists and the positivists, have sug-
gested various conceptions of justice and its implementation. While both schools have
struggled to enforce the system of international criminal law in accordance with their
own theories, neither has been able to curtail the commission of international crimes.
Id. at 686-88.
25. This can be examined within the provisions of Article 5 in conjunction with Part
VII of the Statute of the United Nations. Article 5 concerns crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court. While that Article states that the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to
the most serious international crimes, this power is restricted to the provisions of Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art 5.
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B. The Principle of De Lege Lata
The international struggle for the principle of legality of the system of
international criminal law can be examined in the adoption process of
many international criminal conventions. 2 6 The formulation of many
international conventions for the recognition of certain international
crimes has demonstrated that no prosecution or punishment should be
implemented without due regard to the basic element of criminal law-the
principle of de lege lata.
2 7
One of the important points of the principle of legality is that it pre-
vents the use of ex post facto laws for certain international crimes that are
not consolidated within the conventional or customary norms of interna-
tional criminal law.28 Further, de lege lata reflects justice as the most dom-
inate concept of international criminal jurisdiction for the presentation of
fairness. It would otherwise be against the social relations of states and
individuals to speak of justice but in its retroactive form. It would also be
difficult for an accepted international criminal court to satisfy itself by tak-
ing measures against the accused by referring to certain regulations and
rules that are not an integral part of the system of international criminal
law or are not satisfactory.2 9
On the contrary, it is much easier for the international legal commu-
nity when an international criminal court takes certain steps on its own in
accordance with the particular, general, and jus cogens principles of inter-
national criminal law. Due to these important criteria, the Rome Statute
relies in most part on the principle of de lege lata.3 0 In certain situations,
however, it bases the principle of de lege lata on the politico-legal interpre-
tations of the permanent members of the Security Council of the United
Nations. 31 This shortcoming is indeed against the principle of de lege lata
and is one of the serious weaknesses of the Court. This is also true in the
case of the IST. We will see that in order to avoid any juridical contradic-
tions, we have to take into serious consideration the principle of interna-
tional tribunality of jurisdiction, which is without doubt the most useful
approach for the application of the system of international criminal law to
26. For example, Article 23 of the Rome Statue implies the importance of the princi-
ple of legality. It concerns the matter of nulla poena sine lege and reads that "[a] person
convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute." Rome
Statute, supra note 8, art 23.
27. Id.
28. That is why most international criminal conventions oblige the contracting par-
ties to enact, in accordance with their respective constitutions, the necessary legislation
in order to give effect to the provisions of the relevant conventions.
29. That is why the Rome Statute places emphasis on the applicability of certain
laws that have already been accepted within the system of international criminal law.
See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 21.1(b).
30. For example Article 24 of the Rome Statute relates to the principle of non-retroac-
tivity ratione personae. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 24.
31. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 5. Article 5 states "It]he court shall exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted .... Such a provi-
sion shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations."
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certain international crimes.3 2
International criminal justice ought to be fair and just and should, as
much as possible, correspond with contemporary international criminal
regulations. Further, it should not be the subject of major criticism in the
international legal community. Of course, we do not deny that interna-
tional criminal justice is always under some sort of criticism, but the
degree and the level of criticism depends on the basic validity of the norms
which are used by the court.3 3 Justice as fairness in international criminal
law is to see that if the principle of de lege lata is the main cornerstone of
its essence, the criminal justice system cannot function without the imple-
mentation of this essence. Therefore, with the term de lege lata, we do not
only mean the law in force but also the practice or procedures and proceed-
ings that must be respected in the terms of the international criminal jus-
tice system. Thus, the term de lege lata applies to all types of procedures
that concern the question of the guilt of the accused before an interna-
tional criminal court. In other words, when a person accused of commit-
ting certain criminal violations is captured, all procedures such as the
implication of rules, evidentiary rules, rights of the accused, and pretrial
detention, including the implementation of the principles of human rights,
must be fair and correspond to the prevailing international rules. Thus,
the performance of the rules and norms of international criminal law
implies respect for the principle of de lege lata.3 4
32. See infra Part VI.
33. It is rightly asserted "each war crimes trial is an exercise in selective justice to
the extent that it reminds us that the majority of war crimes go unpunished." Gerry J.
Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 8 (T.L.H. McCormack & GJ. Simpson, eds., 1997). How-
ever, we cannot deny that the international criminal tribunal created by the United
Nations for the prosecution and punishment of Yugoslavian war criminals is one of the
most recognized international criminal courts, since it, like the ICTR, was created by
international legal community as a whole. Both the ICTY and ICTR have created an
important procedure within the legal structure of international criminal law, which can-
not be ignored by any radical international criminal lawyer. This discussion does not,
however, address the principles of justice and proportionality in the context of the ICTR
and ICTY. For some arguments concerning the legal character of the ICTY see George
H. Aldrich, Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 64 (1996). For the consideration of the ICTR see William Schabas,
justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to
Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523 (1996).
34. The Guantanamo Bay detention facility demonstrates the violability of the prin-
ciple of de lege lata and justice, including the principles of international human rights in
the practice of states. See Human Rights Watch, Guantanamo: Give U.N. Monitors Access
to Detainees, HuMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Apr. 19, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/
04/19/cubalO509.htm. The United States, in its acts at Abu Ghraib prison, violated the
basic elements of international criminal justice governing the principles of international
criminal law, including the principles of international human rights. As Human Rights
Watch writes:
The U.S. government's use of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq poses a differ-
ent kind of challenge: not because the scale of the abuse is as large as Darfur,
but because the abuser is so powerful. When most governments breach interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law, they commit a violation. The breach
is condemned or prosecuted, but the rule remains firm. Yet when a government
Vol. 38
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C. The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
An appropriate application of the norms of international criminal law
at the national or international level relies heavily on the authentic imple-
mentation of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The theory of justice
as fairness cannot properly be studied without appropriate consideration
of this principle, as it denotes the legal validity of jurisdiction over a person
accused of committing an international crime. The importance of this
principle cannot only be found within national criminal laws but also in
the consideration and examination of international crimes. Nullum crimen
sine lege has particular relevance for the application of certain criminal pro-
visions within the jurisdiction of international criminal courts. 35 The
function and significance of the principle can be studied in conjunction
with the prosecution and punishment of Hussein and Milogevit. Both
cases involve the implementation of international criminal rules, yet the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege is much more controversial in the IST,
operating under the authority of a national jurisdiction. One of the
problems of the IST is that it applies criminal provisions which were not
previously contained within the Iraqi Criminal Code.3 6
According to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, no person shall
be charged with a crime if his conduct was not illegal within the jurisdic-
tion of the given territory at the time it was committed. The principle of de
lege lata concerns the question of existence of the law, and the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege relates to the existence of the norms of criminal law
that are applicable to criminal conduct. Nullum crimen sine lege constitutes
a significant principle of national and international criminal law and must
always be respected in the structure of any criminal justice system. That is
why no international criminal tribunal should prosecute and punish any
person without sufficient regard for this principle. This principle directly
relates to the integrity of a national or international criminal justice system
and its effect on the level and the degree of prosecution of the accused
person before a criminal court.37
as dominant and influential as the United States openly defies that law and
seeks to justify its defiance, it also undermines the law itself and invites others
to do the same. The U.S. government's deliberate and continuing use of "coer-
cive interrogation" -its acceptance and deployment of torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment-has had this insidious effect, well beyond the
consequences of an ordinary abuser. That unlawful conduct has also under-
mined Washington's much-needed credibility as a proponent of human rights
and a leader of the campaign against terrorism. In the midst of a seeming epi-
demic of suicide bombings, beheadings, and other attacks on civilians and non-
combatants-all affronts to the most basic human rights values-Washington's
weakened moral authority is felt acutely.
KENNETH ROTH, DARFUR AND ABU GHRAIB 2 (2004), http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur
andabughraib/darfurandabughraib.pdf (root website is http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/dar
furandabughraib/index.htm).
35. Article 22 of the Statute of the Permanent International Criminal Court, relating
to general principles of criminal law, concerns the matter of nullum crimen sine lege.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 22.
36. See infra Part V.C.
37. The retroactive nature of IST has led to its condemnation.
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It is a violation of international criminal law to impute rules and provi-
sions that are not wholly an integral part of the principle of de lege lata or
nullum crimen sine lege. Such rules are consistent only with the principle of
de lege ferenda, or "the law of the future." Most international conventions
that are drafted under the general principles of international criminal law
represent de legeferenda. The position of an international criminal conven-
tion that is drafted in the international legal community by the representa-
tives of many states will not change as long as the required number of
ratifications are not made.38 Even the 1998 Rome Statute was until recently
considered only under the principle of de lege ferenda, and not de lege
lata.39 Thus, the ICC could not come into existence without a certain
number of ratifications.40 Throughout this article, I will insist that in
order for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege to be wholly respected in
the IST, we ought to implement the principle of international tribunality of
jurisdiction.4 1 Doing so will avoid any violation of the principles of inter-
national criminal justice and will uphold the principles of de lege lata and
nullum crimen sine lege in the proceeding of the IST. With this in mind,
this article examines the growing conditions of the jurisprudence of inter-
national criminal law for the application of a proper criminal justice system
when national or international criminal courts or tribunals exercise cer-
tain provisions of international criminal law.
I. Dimensions of the Earlier Tribunals
An investigation into the historical background of the system of inter-
national criminal law demonstrates that the most practical contribution of
the states of the world to the prosecution and punishment of heads of state
was introduced after the end of the First World War within the provisions
of the Treaty of Versailles. 42 The Treaty included the establishment of an
international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of war criminals, espe-
cially the punishment of the German head of state, Kaiser William. 43 For
this purpose, the Peace Conference in 1919 appointed a Commission on
the "Responsibility of Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties."
This commission created three sub-commissions which were given differ-
38. A clear example is the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind which has been drafted by the International Law Commission after a long
controversy. The draft has no binding force under the system of international criminal
law. See Report of International Law Commission to General Assembly, 46 U.N.GAOR
Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991), reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2).
39. This was on the ground that a sufficient number of ratifying signatures (60) had
to be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Rome Statute, supra note
8, art 126.
40. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 126 (concerning entry into force).
41. See infra Part VI.
42. See Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 AM. J. INT'L L.
37, 40 (1950).
43. FAHnAD MALEKIAN, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES: A STUDY ON
THE EVOLUTION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY WITH PARTIcuLAR EMPHASIS ON THE CONCEPT OF
CRIME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBLITY 55-58 (1985).
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ent tasks on the following subjects: criminal acts, responsibility for the war,
and responsibility for the violation of the laws and customs of war.4 4 In
short, the Commission stated that those who were responsible for the out-
break of war should be prosecuted "for supreme offences against interna-
tional morality and the sanctity of treaties." The 1919 peace treaty
concluded in Versailles had a number of significant provisions for the pros-
ecution and punishment of those accused of violating the laws and cus-
toms of war formulated in the contexts of Articles 227, 228, 231, and
232.4 5 Among many other suggestions, the Treaty of Versailles empha-
sized the creation of a "special tribunal" for the trial of those who commit-
ted criminal acts during the war.4 6 However, the relevant provisions of the
Treaty concerning the establishment of a tribunal for the prosecution of
accused war criminals were never implemented and therefore was of no
practical help to war victims. 4 7
There were many reasons for the nonattributability and non-imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Treaty in international criminal law.
One reasons was the refuge of Kaiser William in the Netherlands. A fur-
ther reason was the political character of the crime, which reduced the
juridical prosecution of the German head of the state.48 However, to be
concise, the non-enforcement of the relevant provisions of the Treaty was
mostly determined by problematically inequitable provisions of the Treaty
and upon the non-existence of a prior impartial international criminal tri-
bunal, which could bring the perpetrators of international crimes before
the appropriate international criminal jurisdiction.49 For example, it was
not clear what type of proceedings would be most useful in the prosecution
of the accused. This question was much more sensible in a case dealing
with the prosecution of a head of state, given that heads of state have spe-
cial immunities under civil and criminal jurisdiction, which excuse them
from any type of interrogation. Additionally, the militarily strong states
had no interest in the establishment of an international criminal tribunal
having international juridical authority over heads of state or government.
In particular, a forum, its judges and its prosecutors could not be author-
ized to recognize a head of state as a violator of international criminal pro-
44. Id. at 55.
45. Id. at 56-57.
46. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany art. 227,
June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 285 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
47. According to Kelsen, Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty established collective
responsibility rather than individual responsibility for violations of the norms of inter-
national law. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 132-33 (2d prtg. 2003).
48. MALEKiAN, supra note 43, at 57-58.
49. After World War I, approximately 900 individuals were recognized as alleged war
criminals. The Supreme Court at Leipzig, Germany became responsible for the exercise
of jurisdiction. Of these accused persons, it was decided that twelve would face criminal
trial. Three of these did not come before the Supreme Court. The Court also dropped
all charges against three others, and the remaining six received the most minimal pun-
ishment available. AM. HiST. Ass'N, WHAT SHALL BE DONE ABOUT GERMANY AFTER THE
WAR?, G.I. ROUNDTABLE SERIES No. 11, at 13 (1944), available at http://eli.sls.lib.il.us/
cgi-bin/ida/fullidarecord.pl?record=157 ("What Happened After the Last War?").
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visions.50 Finally, the treaty rules governing the prosecution and
punishment of accused persons, including heads of state, were largely ret-
roactive and arbitrary. The relevant rules of the treaty therefore violated
the principle of de lege lata.5 1
This inability to use international justice to bring the perpetrators of
the First World War under international criminal jurisdiction for prosecu-
tion and punishment caused much difficulty for the next generation of the
international legal community, faced with World War 11.52 The questions
that could not be answered and dealt with in an international criminal
tribunal in the beginning of the last century were now passed into the basic
foundation of the Charter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.5 3 The
politicians as well as the tribunal judges were forced to deal with questions
relating to the tribunal's proceedings, especially the very significant and
sensitive question of the law, namely whether the laws, rules, provisions,
norms, and all the proceedings, including implementation, evidentiary
rules, and the interrogation of the accused constituted a manifestation of
the principles of de lege lata, de lege ferenda, or whether they constituted a
retroactive or ex post facto law.5 4 Unfortunately, these questions reduced
50. Quincy Wright, Notes on International Affairs: The Legal Liability of the Kaiser, 13
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 120, 121 (1919).
51. While there is no special condition for the interpretation of the principle of jus-
tice in international law and international criminal law, it indicates the way in which the
terminology of justice is discussed and explained by different nations in the interna-
tional community. If the outcome of justice is known and properly acknowledged by
most national societies having given rights and duties to participate in the conclusion of
international agreements and the distribution of justice at the same level and degree
with other nations, the principles of de lege lata are, most probably, correctly delivered
to the subjects of their attributability. A simple explanation for the principle of de lege
lata is that it should present the total sum of norms and rules that have been determined
by all those who are a part of our international legal and political community. They
should reflect those norms of international behavior that nations have acknowledged
within their values. In this instance, one searches for the recognition of an appropriate
initial status quo in order to insure that the principles of justice that may be recognized
in the process of formulating an international convention are based on fundamental
elements of criminal justice as recognized by all nations. In order for the role of interna-
tional criminal justice to be correct, it should be connected to the mental, moral, and
economic requirements of nations that are weak and strong. Justice can scarcely func-
tion properly if its fundamental norms dismiss the will of all nations. Where the princi-
ple of international criminal justice is not respected by the weak, it may be a protest to
an unjustifiable situation.
52. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 12 (analyzing the extent of the legal prohibi-
tion on the use of force by states, and the quality of this prohibition).
53. According to the victors of the Second World War, the idea of the establishment
of an international criminal tribunal was principally based on frequent violations of the
principles of the law of armed conflict by the German armed forces. Consequently, the
constitution of an international criminal tribunal was drafted in the London Agreement
in 1944 and thereafter accepted by many states including the United States, Britain, the
Soviet Union, and France. The Constitution of the International Military Tribunal appar-
ently created the legal grounds for the victors to establish an international criminal tri-
bunal in Nuremberg. Many individuals were accused of war crimes and were brought
before the Tribunal. Truman Presidential Museum & Library, The War Crimes Trials at
Nuremberg, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/nuremberg
(last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
54. MALEKIAN, supra note 43, at 62-67.
Vol. 38
2005 Philosophy of International Criminal Justice
the legal value of international criminal jurisdiction or international crimi-
nal justice for the future.5 5 In other words, the Holocaust became a true
question of international moral justice without any realistic and sophisti-
cated answer while real justice, as would have been appreciated and consol-
idated in the legal literature of international criminal law, missed its
juridical goals.5 6
The shortcoming of the international legal and political community of
that time can also be examined in the United Nations Charter. The Char-
ter did not establish an international criminal court and did not redraft,
modify, or translate the Charter of the Tribunals into the law of the United
Nations. The only contribution of the world superpowers of the time was
to support the World War 11 tribunals. The refusal to create an interna-
tional criminal court in the United Nations Charter was due to monopoli-
zation of the vocabulary of true international justice by those who were
and are responsible for the maintenance of international peace, security,
and equality of states. Due to this situation, the legal questions of interna-
tional criminal justice were left unsolved. More importantly, the issue of
bringing world leaders to justice through the use of an international crimi-
nal court was left for future generations.
The provisions of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
have not only been violated by many non-member states but even by the
permanent members of the United Nations in their international relations
with other states. After the creation of the International Military Tribunal,
no other permanent international tribunal was established, until the for-
mation of the ICC. Consequently, crimes against peace, war crimes,
55. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal handed down only eleven capital
sentences. See Douglas 0. Linder, The Nuremberg Trials, in FAMOUS WORLD TRIALS,
NUREMBERG TRIALS 1945-1949, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/
nuremberg/nurembergACCOUNT.htm. Similarly, the Tokyo Tribunal sentenced only
seven Japanese to execution. See War Crimes Tribunals, at http://www.facts.com/icof/
nazi.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2005).
56. On the Nuremberg Tribunal see generally TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 NUREMBERG,
OCTOBER 1946-APRIL 1949 (1949); TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTER-
NATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946 (1947);
22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN
NUREMBERG (1947); SHELDON GLUECK, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
(1946); Nicholas Doman, Political Consequences of the Nuremberg Trial, 246 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 81 (1946); Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial against the Major
War Criminals and International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 223 (1949); George Augustus
Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1947); Sheldon
Glueck, By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried?, 56 HARv. L. REv.1059 (1943);
Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HAiv. L. REV. 396 (1946);
Robert H. Jackson, Forward: The Nurnberg Trial Becomes an Historical Precedent, 20
TEMP. L. Q. 167 (1947); Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgement of the Nurnberg Trial Constitute
a Precedent in International Law?, 1 INT'L L.Q. 153 (1947); Arthur K. Kuhn, International
Criminal Jurisdiction, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 430 (1947); F.B. Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and
the International Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 770 (1947); Henry L. Stirmson, The
Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN ArF. 179 (1947); Herbert Wechsler, The
Issues of the Nuremberg Trial, 62 POL. SCL Q. 11 (1947); Quincy Wright, The Law of the
Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1947).
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crimes against humanity, as well as other international crimes such as
genocide 57 and apartheid,5 8 have been committed by a considerable num-
ber of states. The international crimes of genocide and apartheid were
not recognized and constituted as international crimes at the end of the
work of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, even though
such crimes had already been committed during World War II.
The misinterpretation of the international criminal system and the
controlling of the concept of crime, criminality, and the notion of justice in
the central international organizations, such as the United Nations, have
obviously been some of the strongest reasons for the grave violations of the
system of international criminal law after the establishment of the United
Nations. A clear example of the commission of genocide occurred under
the authority of one of the most militarily strong permanent members of
the United Nations, namely, the United States. The genocide during the
Vietnam War is only one of the many illustrative examples of the non-exis-
tence of a true international criminal justice system in the 1970s. During
the Vietnam War, a considerable number of international crimes were com-
mitted but none of the perpetrators of these crimes were brought before
any type of international criminal tribunal for prosecution and punish-
ment.59 They were not therefore recognized as major war criminals or as
ordinary criminals under Vietnamese territorial criminal jurisdiction. No
government even claimed the application of the principle of universal juris-
diction. The only non-governmental approach to the serious breaches of
the humanitarian law of armed conflict was the Russell War Crimes Tribu-
nal.60 Similarly, to note but a few are the notorious mass murders in Alge-
ria, Biafra, and Indonesia in the 1960s; in Cambodia, East Timor, and
Uganda in the 1970s; in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran in the 1980s; in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, Rwanda,6 1 Kosovo, and Zaire in the 1990s; in Sierra
Leone at the start of the twenty-first century; and the prolonged Israeli
governmental crimes since 1980.62 Presently, the serious fundamental
57. See generally PIETER N. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE (1959) (analyzing
the Convention on Genocide and offering a conspectus of proposals).
58. LESLIE RUBIN, UNITED NATIONS, APARTHEID IN PRACTICE (1971); Bernhard
Graefrath, Convention Against the Crime of Apartheid, 11 GERMAN FOREIGN POL'Y 395
(1972).
59. A number of categories of international crimes were committed, including
crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, unlawful use of weapons,
torture, genocide, crimes against cultural property, and crimes against the natural envi-
ronment. See Michael D. Sallah & Mitch Weiss, Elite Unit Savaged Civilians in Vietnam,
TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 22, 2003, available at littp://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20031022/SRTIGERFORCE/110190169.
60. Arlette El Kaim-Sartre, A Summary of the Evidence and the Judgements, in ON
GENOCIDE 3-6 (1968); MALEKIAN, supra note 13 at 114-20.
61. In Rwanda, approximately one million people were slaughtered in just three
months. See Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Report of the
Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Sequi, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on Human Rights, 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, Ci 24, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1995/7 (Jan. 17, 1995).
62. See MALEKaN, supra note 13, at 281, 285, 392; see also AMNESTY INT'L, ANNUAL
REPORT 1974-75 (1975); AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT ON TORTURE (1975); AMNESTY INT'L,
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violations of international criminal law in Afghanistan by the United States
remain an unsolved question of international criminal justice. 63 Many of
the violations outlined above were recognized as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, or crimes against the humanitarian law of armed
conflicts. The commission of those crimes was so serious that the United
Nations has established several criminal courts for the prosecution and
punishment of the accused. Examples of these include the ICTR and the
ad hoc court for East Timor. The important feature of these criminal
courts is that they are drafted, guided, and implemented under the supervi-
sion of the United Nations and particularly by international judges. This
means that these tribunals are, in one way or another, implementing the
provisions of international criminal law over accused persons with due
regard to international justice. By this, I mean that their systems are less
criticized by the international legal community. In other words, certain
political parties do not monopolize their operation, unlike in the IST. This
is particularly important when questions of international criminal respon-
sibility of heads of state are the most important part of conventional and
customary international criminal law.64 Of particular importance is the
Rome Statute. It clarifies that:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State
or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected repre-
sentative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, consti-
tute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.6 5
Both subsections in the Rome statute state that an individual's official
capacity for the purpose of attribution of international criminal responsi-
bility is irrelevant. This is a clear statement of the application and imple-
mentation of the system of international criminal law which needs no
modification by any special tribunal.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 88-89, 340-45 (1984); Richard A. Falk, World Order
Conceptions and the Peace Process in the Middle East, in BUILDING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 189-96 (Elise Boulding ed., 1994); Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Rele-
vance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal
Defense of the Intifada, 32 HAuv. INr' L.J. 129, 132-56 (1991).
63. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Abuses by US Forces, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS,
Mar. 8, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/08/afghan8073.htm.
64. The question of individual international criminal responsibility has long been
considered in the system of international criminal law. This can particularly be seen
within the provisions of international criminal conventions. For example, Article 25 of
the Rome Statute relates to individual criminal responsibility. Rome Statute, supra note
8, art. 25.
65. Id. art. 27.
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Il1. The Tragedy of Criminal Justice and Milogevit
Although the system of international criminal law extends from vari-
ous points of view, international criminal violations are the most serious
problems faced by the international legal and political community, One of
the most well known and serious violations of international criminal law
occurred at the end of the last century in the former Yugoslavia.6 6 These
violations led to the creation of the most well known international criminal
tribunal to have been established in the decades following the Nuremberg
and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals.6 7 The ICTY was established under the
legal and political authority of the United Nations. 68 The Statute of the
Tribunal concentrates on the creation of jurisdiction over the violators of
the system of international criminal law in order to prosecute and punish
them on an international level for the crimes that have been committed
between 1991 and 1995.
The ICTY started its task in early 1995. Since that time, the Tribunal
has been engaged in the prosecution of a number of individuals for viola-
tions of the humanitarian law of armed conflict and the norms of interna-
tional criminal law. One of the most serious cases that has been brought
before the Tribunal's jurisdiction is that of Slobodan Milogevit. Milogevit,
the President of the former Yugoslavia, has been accused of committing
grave violations of international criminal law. 69 The Milo~evit case may be
considered one of the first cases in the history of international criminal
law 70 that has involved an international criminal tribunal for the prosecu-
66. According to the ICTY Statute, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions were
committed. These were:
(a) willful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile
power;
(f) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and
regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking civilians as hostages.
ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art 2.
67. ICTY Statute, supra note 4 (adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May
25, 1993)).
68. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
69. The Tribunal has been dealing with the case for a long period of time, without
result. See Marlise Simons, A Warmer Tone in Court as Milogevie Pursues his Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at A10.
70. No tribunal has ever been created for the prosecution of heads of state on an
international level. For example, consider the case of Napoleon Bonaparte. After con-
quering most of Europe during the early nineteenth century, he was eventually defeated
by British and Prussian forces. While there was an attempt to prosecute and punish him
as a war criminal, this idea never came to fruition, and the British government ultimately
chose a political rather than a juridical solution. See Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes
History and Definition, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 562 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni, ed., 1973). The United States Supreme Court dealt with the question of the
criminal responsibility of heads of state in 1812, concluding that heads of state are
Vol. 38
2005 Philosophy of International Criminal Justice
tion and punishment of a head of state.71 One of the most important tasks
of the ICTY is to deal with the gravity of the concept of international crimi-
nal responsibility and to attribute certain penalties for atrocities and grave
violations of international criminal law that occurred under Milogevit's
political and legal authority.7 2
As we will examine in the Hussein case, Milogevit is accused of com-
mitting a number of international crimes during the war. Specifically, the
charges against Milo~evit include (i) violations of the law of armed conflict
during the atrocities carried out in Kosovo in 1995, (ii) violations of the
provisions of international criminal law concerning crimes against human-
ity committed in Croatia in 1991 and 1992, and (iii) violations of the provi-
sions of the International Convention on Genocide, namely the alleged
genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. 73  Thus,
Milo~evit has allegedly committed at least three categories of international
crimes-war crimes,74 crimes against humanity, 75 and genocide. All three
are an integral part of one another and in many situations, from a juridical
point of view, they overlap. Acts that constitute crimes against humanity
or war crimes cannot necessarily be categorized as genocide. However,
because of genocide's wide scope, when it is committed during a war, it
can also be specified as both a war crime and a crime against humanity.
The Nuremberg tribunal had a similar rule but not concerning the crime of
genocide which was criminalized after the Second World War. It must be
emphasized that war crimes or crimes against humanity do not necessarily
need to be specified as "systematic", which is one of the basic elements for
the recognition of genocide.76
The ICTY is one of the illustrative examples of an international crimi-
nal tribunal that has been internationally created and possesses a broad
range of authority to prosecute and punish former heads of state. 77
Although certain criticisms have been levied against the ICTY, it must be
acknowledged that the Tribunal's charter is based on the great willingness
of the majority of states to prosecute and punish war criminals. Accord-
ingly, the legislation of the Tribunal does not contain any distinctions
between those who were involved in the commission of an international
responsible for breaches of law. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon and Others, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
71. For example, in the case of Japanese Emperor Hirohito, the allied forces ulti-
mately decided not to try him in front of an international tribunal. See M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent
International Criminal Court, 10 I-LRv. HUM. RTs. J. 11, 35 (1997).
72. For an analysis of the concept of individual criminal responsibility in the ICTY
see James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanita-
rian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 639, 651 (1993).
73. See ICTY Statute, supra note 4.
74. Id. arts. 2, 3.
75. Id. art. 5.
76. Another essential condition for the recognition of the crime of genocide is the
element of intent. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 4.2.
77. ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 9; see also JONES & POWLES, supra note 1, at
348-53.
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crime. 78 This is reflected in the Milogevit trial itself.7 9
IV. The Tragedy of Criminal Justice and Hussein
The non-existence of a centralized international organization having
the power to enforce international criminal law has made the maintenance
of security, peace, and justice in the international legal realm much more
difficult. Consequently, violations of international criminal law have not
only become more frequent, but also have affected the way in which states,
governments, and heads of states try to settle their military, political, and
economic conflicts. One of the clear examples of the tragedy of interna-
tional criminal justice is the case of Saddam Hussein and the violations of
national and international criminal law under his political authority as
head of state of Iraq.8 0 Therefore, the international crimes that have been
committed under Hussein's presidency are, in one sense, similar to the
international crimes that have been committed under Milogevit's author-
ity.8 1 The Statute of the IST reflects this important fact.
The Statute was drafted exclusively for the crimes committed under
the authority of those who were working for the Iraqi regime and had par-
ticipated, in one way or another, in the commission of those national and
international crimes.8 2 In fact, the United States military forces captured
Saddam Hussein in December 2003, and in the beginning of the next year
declared that Hussein was a prisoner of war according to the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. According to the Statute of the IST, Hus-
sein and many other individuals are accused of having committed several
categories of international crimes.8 3 These include serious violations of
the provisions of the International Convention on Genocide,8 4 violations
78. ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 7.
79. However, the ICTY has not been able to prosecute Milogevit properly because of
his ability to control the Tribunal psychologically.
80. See generally MAJID KHADDURI, THE GULF WAR: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF
THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT (1988); MAJID KHADDURI & EDMUND GHAREED, WAR IN THE GULF,
1990-91: THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (1997); THE GULF WAR OF
1980-1988: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (Ige F. Dekker &
Harry H.G. Post, eds., 1992) (presenting perspectives on the law of war in the context of
the Iran-Iraq war); THE GULF WAR: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS (Hanns W.
Maull & Otto Pick eds., 1989).
81. See generally KHADDURI & GHIAREED, supra note 80; I.F. Dekker and H.H.G. Post,
The Gulf War from the Point of View of International Law, 17 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 75
(1986) (analyzing the history and development of the Iran-Iraq conflict).
82. Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, Order No. 48, Delegation of Authority
Regarding Establishment of an Iraqi Special Tribunal (Dec. 10, 2003), available at http:/
/www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48-IST-and-Appendix-A.
pdf.; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 10, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231, available
at http://iraq-ist.org/en/about/statute.htm [hereinafter IST Statute].
83. Professor Bassiouni drafted this Statute at the request of the United States. Law-
yers in the coalition's legal office from Britain, Australia, and the United States then
vetted the draft. See Edith M. Lederer, New Iraqi War Crimes Tribunal Ironically Emulates
International Court U.S. Opposes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 20, 2003, available at http://
www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2003/1220ironic.htm.
84. See IST Statute, supra note 82, art. 11.
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of the provisions of international criminal law applicable to crimes against
humanity,8 5 and grave breaches of the provisions of the Geneva Conven-
tions applicable in time of war constituting war crimes. 8 6 Moreover, the
Iraqi Statute also refers to other acts in violation of the fundamental struc-
ture of national legislation. This category is dealt with under a separate
article concerning violations of stipulated Iraqi laws.
8 7
The philosophy of justice in international criminal law that was not
appropriately dealt with in connection with other international violations
in international relations has now generated a very serious question
regarding the maintenance of authentic international criminal justice in the
case of Saddam Hussein. In other words, the inability of the international
political and juridical community to deal with questions regarding the
application of international criminal justice to international criminals
before and after the Second World War created juridical and political con-
ditions under which the former heads of state of Iraq and the former Yugo-
slavia could notoriously develop their criminal actions during their
presidencies. For example, during his presidency, Hussein committed
many unlawful acts against his own and other nations, including acts
against the Kurdish population and during the Iran-Iraq War.8 8 The use of
chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurdish8 9 population and those com-
mitted during the war against the Iran 9 ° can never be vacuumed from the
history of mutilation of human beings, given that the United Nations had
already been established for at least forty years, and was supposed to create
justice, security, equality, and peace. 9 1
The serious violations of human rights laws during Hussein's presi-
dency were not only a national tragedy for the Iraqi people but also a very
serious tragedy for international criminal justice generally, which has
scarcely been able to maintain justice and peace in accordance with inter-
national rules that have been formulated within the United Nations Char-
ter and numerous international criminal conventions. Thus, international
justice, which had been promised under the United Nations Charter has
been, in most serious situations, symbolic and not practical for the imple-
85. See id. art. 12.
86. See id. art. 13.
87. See id. art. 14.
88. The United States government supported criminal acts of Hussein. See ALEX
ATRoUSHI, BLOODY FRIDAY, CHEMICAL MASSACRE OF THE KuRDS BY THE IRAQI REGIME, http://
www.kdp.pp.se/chemical.html (last visited Apr 23, 2005).
89. See Norm Dixon, How the U.S. Armed Saddam Hussein with Chemical Weapons,
GREEN LEFT (2002), http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2002/506/506p12.htm.
90. Id.
91. The purposes and principles of the Charter are partly formulated within Article
1. It reads:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situ-
ations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
U.N. Charter art.1, 11 1.
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mentation of the international legal order and the prevention of interna-
tional crimes. In short, the United Nations has failed to perform its duties.
V. International Criminal Responsibility
A. Generally
Nothing in the law is as important as the question of liability or
responsibility. This is certainly true in the case of international criminal
law. In fact, the whole body of international criminal law is based on the
notion of attributing responsibility to persons who commit international
crimes.92 My aim here is to examine whether the concept of international
criminal responsibility that has been included in the ICTY and the Statute
of the IST presents justice, as it is understood by the majority of nations.
The term "international criminal responsibility" has no appropriate mean-
ing without a proper understanding of the concept of true international
criminal justice that is expressed by an impartial international criminal
tribunal.93 It is however very difficult to give a constructive definition to
the question of international criminal jurisdiction as presenting the fair
and right concept of justice in international criminal law. We have to prop-
erly consider what principles of justice are acceptable to the international
legal community and, at the same time, ensure that those principles are
acknowledged by the majority of the nations of the world.
The complicity in the definition of the term "justice", especially in
international criminal law, creates difficulties in the application of the con-
cept of international criminal responsibility to individuals who have com-
mitted international crimes. That is why we have to give a chain of
definitions to the term "international criminal justice" as presenting equal-
ity between different subjects of the law. 94 It is therefore on this proposi-
tion that the system of justice and criminal responsibility should be based.
In other words, justice represents equality, and equality gives rise to the
concept of criminal responsibility in international criminal law. Thus,
international criminal law should apply equally to all those responsible for
illegal conduct.95 Under this principle, international criminal law should
not only apply to Hussein, but also, historically, to those who have violated
and are violating the system.96
Given the basic position and the reasons for delivering international
criminal justice, we may automatically divide the concept of international
criminal responsibility into three classes. One class is the international
criminal responsibility that is directly or indirectly recognized by the pow-
92. See Malekian, supra note 2, at 153.
93. See supra Part I.
94. See supra Part I.
95. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 25-33.
96. For example, international criminal law should apply to those governments,
such as the United States, which participated in Hussein's international criminal
actions.
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erful states in the United Nations Security Council. 97 The second class
relates to the concept of international criminal responsibility that is attrib-
uted in accordance with the jurisdiction of a national or international crim-
inal court. Finally, the third class relates to the concept of international
criminal responsibility that is not necessarily stated by an international
criminal court or the Security Council members but rather through the
strong tendency and the will of most nations of the world to bring the
perpetrators of certain acts to justice. Between these three classes of jus-
tice, the first relies on the resolutions and military powers of the Security
Council. The second is based on the principle of de lege lata that is the
result of the provisions of international criminal conventions. The third
class is different, however, as it is based on the cultural, moral, religious,
theoretical, and economic understanding of different nations of what
should constitute a violation of international criminal law and what should
not. For example, the Holocaust of the Second World War was surely
unjust and immoral and constituted without doubt a crime against man-
kind. This conclusion can always be achieved regardless of whether or not
the Nuremberg Tribunal was established by the victorious states, as our
judgments are based on actions that are against the standard of human
society and human protection, especially the protection of civilians.
In this way, we may indicate a wider understanding of the concept of
justice in international criminal law and we may at the same time find a
larger conception of international criminal responsibility based on the
principles of international criminal law. International criminal justice is
thus not just the expression of the circumstances of the time by the strong
military powers but also the conditions under which our understanding of
the matters alternates with due regard to the progressive development and
evolution of international civilization as in the case of slavery and war
crimes.98 Furthermore, it would be very strange if we would speak about
97. We must not forget, however, that when we face an international case which is
brought under the consideration of the Security Council for the application of interna-
tional criminal responsibility, we face international tensions and reactions regarding the
subject matter of interest. Therefore, a criminal case that is brought before the Council
concerns an important matter of international justice. It indicates also the existence of
a conflict in the international legal system. Here, the permanent members of the Secur-
ity Council cannot officially modify the principle of de lege lata and the concept of
responsibility, but surely can modify it by new interpretations characterizing its own
political interests. A clear example was the Gulf crisis and the propaganda relating to
Hussein's prohibited chemical weapons. It has, however, become clear today that the
case was brought before the Security Council because of America's political interests.
Here again we have a clear example of international criminal monopolization of interna-
tional criminal justice. This creates conflicts between what the principle of de lege lata
is and what its practical interpretation appears to be. The Gulf Crisis in 2003 has surely
modified the system of international criminal law and the way in which we interpret
international criminal justice. See generally Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the
Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspec-
tion Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (1999).
98. Apart from the concept of justice which has prevailed due to the support of
strong states but lacks legitimacy in the international relations of states, many states
have struggled to cooperate with one another to create certain circumstances which can
prevent acts they deem immoral. For example, the slavery conventions and the four
693
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the concept of criminal responsibility only in relation to international
courts and tribunals. The concept of international criminal responsibility
in the Nuremberg tribunal developed due to the world's opinion about
criminals with the reservation that the concept was, for many, retroactive
and did not fulfil the conditions for the principle of de lege lata and attribu-
tion of the concept of juridical responsibility. Thus, in the course of an
international criminal tribunal, such as the ICTY, we would expect that the
judges of the Tribunal are delivering the highest standard of international
justice regarding the investigations, proceedings, and conclusions of the
case. 99 That is why we insist on the implementation of jurisdiction on an
international level for the most serious international crimes committed by
individuals or states.10 0 With this we wish to hinder any type of justice
which is prejudiced by strong or weak political parties in the United
Nations. 10 1 The purpose is to create an impartial and neutral jurisdiction,
as well as to ensure that the conclusions of the court or the tribunal are
accepted by the international legal and political community. I am focusing
here on the IST, created under the political order of the United States' 0 2 as
well as the ICTY. 10 3 In focusing on these two tribunals, I wish to apply an
equal concept of international criminal responsibility to those who are
accused of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
B. Criminal Responsibility of Milogevit
Considering the concept of international criminal justice, one can see
that the ICTY has been able to prosecute many individuals who have alleg-
edly committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 10 4
The tribunal has not considered the juridical or political position or
authority of the accused person in his home state in its operation. Thus,
neither ordinary individuals nor superiors are permitted to escape prosecu-
tion and punishment. In the Milogevit case, then, his international crimi-
nal responsibility is considered a fact in the ICTY procedures and the
judges must deal with all of his criminal actions.10 5
Geneva Conventions were created because of the infringement of international morality
and the need for the globalization of the international legal system. See generally FER-
ENCZ, supra note 1.
99. See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF
THE ICTY. (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2004) (presenting discussions on
the development and application of international criminal law in the ICTY).
100. These include aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, tor-
ture, and unlawful use of weapons.
101. For various discussions relating to the Security Council rules in the matter of
international crimes, see generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME
OF AGGRESSION (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004).
102. See GHOSHRAY, supra note 18.
103. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY,
supra note 99 (presenting discussions on the development and application of interna-
tional criminal law in the ICTY).
104. Id.
105. ICTY Statute, supra note 4.
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Article 7 of the ICTY Statute concerns international criminal responsi-
bility of the individuals who have participated in the commission of inter-
national crimes during the war in the former Yugoslavia. 10 6 The words of
the Article are clear-it calls for international criminal responsibility for
those who have committed international crimes. The terms of the article
apply to heads of state as well as ordinary citizens. The conception of jus-
tice as fairness and rightness not only results in direct satisfaction for the
victims of the crimes, but also the recognition of those important norms of
international criminal law that are applicable in certain situations. Thus,
we must have a direct definition of the concept of international criminal
responsibility in conjunction with the concept of international criminal
justice, which is delivered by impartial judges that are selected by and
under the authority of the United Nations, with due regard to the majority
views of the members of the General Assembly. 10 7
The provisions of the ICTY Statute must therefore be examined in con-
junction with the provisions of international criminal law concerning the
attribution of responsibility to the accused. Article 7 of the Statute rejects
the concept of immunity for former heads of state. Further, no mitigation
of punishment is permitted under the terms of the article. Although the
Statute may be criticized from various points of view, it is nevertheless
obvious that it creates a certain discipline of justice that cannot be rejected
in the international criminal system because of its united policy of imple-
mentation under United Nations authority. But this is not the whole pic-
ture of international criminal justice, and justice cannot only be measured
in the Milogevit trial. The explanation for the Hussein trail makes this
argument illustrative.
106. Id. art. 7. Article 7 specifies that:
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Gov-
ernment or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person
of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government
or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be con-
sidered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines
that justice so requires.
Id.
107. Id. art. 13 (governing the qualifications and elections of judges); see also Rome
Statute, supra note 8, arts. 35, 36.
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C. Criminal Responsibility of Hussein
Article 15 of the Statute of the IST governs the concept of international
criminal responsibility. The provisions of this article are significantly dif-
ferent from those of Article 7 of the ICTY. This is primarily because the
basic conditions of the Iraqi Tribunal have been based on the juridical and
political power of the victorious states within the occupied territory. Fur-
ther, Iraqi national criminal provisions have been utilized when the rules of
international criminal law could not be properly applied.
Article 15 of the IST Statute puts special emphasis on the concept of
individual criminal responsibility. It states that an official position may
not be used to escape liability. No immunity is given for the crimes listed
in the Statute, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against human-
ity.108 The logical consequences of the provisions of the article conflict
108. Article 15 reads:
a) A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal shall
be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this
Statute.
b) In accordance with this Statute, and the provisions of Iraqi criminal law, a
person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal if that person:
1. Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is crimi-
nally responsible;
2. Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact
occurs or is attempted;
3. For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids,
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission,
including providing the means for its commission;
4. In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commis-
sion of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.
Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
i. Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the com-
mission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or
ii. Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit
the crime;
5. In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others
to commit genocide;
6. Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur
because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However,
a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise pre-
vents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under
this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely
and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
c) The official position of any accused person, whether as president, prime min-
ister, member of the cabinet, chairman or a member of the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council, a member of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party Regional Command
or Government (or an instrumentality of either) or as a responsible Iraqi Gov-
ernment official or member of the Ba'ath Party or in any other capacity, shall
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with the way in which national and international criminal courts
behave. 109
Looking at the IST and the concept of criminal responsibility of a per-
sons accused of committing certain international or national crimes, a sim-
ple question is whether the Tribunal can properly and impartially attribute
the concept of international criminal responsibility to those who have been
brought before it.' 1 0 On the one hand, in certain situations, such as those
former Iraqi government officials who systematically committed a range of
international crimes, the application of justice by the judges and prosecu-
tors who were victims of their criminal acts is very problematic.' 1 ' How
can the judges be impartial in the application of international criminal jus-
tice or national criminal justice in certain serious cases? On the other
hand, justice is not just the implementation of some type of jurisdiction
but the very balanced and unbiased presentation of the notion of rightness
and fairness with due regard to the principles of proportionality, reciproc-
ity, impartiality, and the global accountability of the judges in the field of
international human rights. Moreover, within the sphere of international
criminal law, there are acts or omissions for which international criminal
responsibility can only properly be imposed either by accurately empower-
ing an international criminal court or tribunal or by an ad hoc court
empowered under the authority of the United Nations. Thus, the condi-
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. No
person is entitled to any immunity with respect to any of the crimes stipulated
in Articles 11 to 14.
d) The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 11 to 14 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
e) The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government
or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be con-
sidered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so
requires.
IST Statute, supra note 83, art. 15.
109. This is because the legal personality of the Tribunal is domestic; it lacks an inter-
national legal capacity. For instance, according to Article 4 of the Rome Statute, which
governs the legal statute and powers of the court, "[tihe Court shall have international
legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exer-
cise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes." Rome Statute, supra note 8, art.
4. This means that the impartiality of the court must be the first step when applying the
provisions of international criminal law. Moreover, the concepts of crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide did not exist in Iraq's former national criminal
code, yet they will be employed by the IST. Thus, they may be criticised as ex post facto
laws, and, therefore, may be considered a serious violation of the principles of interna-
tional human rights.
110. This is clearly stated in Article 36(3)(a) on qualifications, nominations, and
elections of ICC judges. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 36(3)(a).
111. Furthermore, the judges of the IST have no knowledge of criminal law and inter-
national criminal law. The occupying power has taught them in London. One must not
forget that competence in criminal law and procedure is a primary condition for election
to an international tribunal, such as the ICC. See id. art. 36(3)(b)(i).
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tions and circumstances of the attribution of certain international crimes
such as genocide requires the principle of international tribunality of juris-
diction. 112 Tribunals or courts of an entirely international or semi-interna-
tional character exercise partial international jurisdiction through their
application of international criminal law and, more significantly, by their
constitution. Even in the case of a national criminal court, the court may
exercise jurisdiction through the legislation applied and the appropriate
provisions of international criminal law justified by international criminal
jurisdictions.
VI. Application of the Principle of Internationality of the Courts
A. Hostis Human Generis
The principle of universality in the system of international criminal
law is the oldest and most consolidated principle in the international legal
system. The whole theory of the principle of universality rests on the very
concept of prosecution and punishment of certain criminals whose activi-
ties constitute crimes against a generation of mankind and cannot be
accepted in any civilized society. This is what is known as hostis humani
generis. The principle of universality is based on the concept of delicta
juris gentium. The principle thus represents an exceptional situation in
which a state has a right to bring a foreigner, who has committed a crime
neither necessarily under the state's territorial jurisdiction nor against the
nationals of that state, under its criminal jurisdiction for prosecution and
punishment. This jurisdictional right of a state to try an offender is based
on the principle of protection of societal values for the interest of the inter-
national community as a whole.
The concept of universal jurisdiction was traditionally applicable only
to those activities whose offensive nature was already accepted in the
national legislatures of the majority of states of the world. This included
murder, under national criminal law, and the crime of piracy, under inter-
national law. 113 Consequently, the universality principle allowed extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over offenders of other nations. No state in certain
situations, such as the crime of piracy, could legally protest to the prose-
112. I do not reject the fact that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide has provided two different mechanisms for the implementation
of its provisions. Article VI of the Convention provides "[plersons charged with geno-
cide or any other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of
the State in the Territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art. VI, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S.
277. In practice, however, national courts have been reluctant to exercise jurisdiction
over individuals who have committed genocide. The provisions of the Genocide Con-
vention have been employed in the ICTY and the ICTR.
113. Whether piracy was accepted as an international crime depended on the politi-
cal relations between states. See MALEKIAN, supra note 13, at 525.
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cuting state. 114
Universal jurisdiction may, therefore, traditionally apply to certain
crimes, the legal characterizations of which are consolidated under conven-
tional or customary international law. These include piracy and certain
crimes committed during war.115 Accordingly, every state, regardless of its
participation in the formulation, adoption, and ratification of multilateral
conventions has a right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over those
who have committed the above mentioned crimes, without due regard to
their nationality, as long as the offender is in the state's custody when he is
brought to trial. This is called judex deprehensionis. A state cannot force
another state to extradite an alleged offender under its jurisdictional
authority in order to prosecute and punish him on the basis of universal
jurisdiction. The first right of prosecution is given to the state that has
arrested the offender. This right is absolute and cannot be transformed
without the free consent of the relevant state.
The issue of universal jurisdiction may be faced in the Hussein trail.
For example, since Hussein is in American custody, the United States may
have, according to the principle of universality, a traditional legal right to
bring the accused under its jurisdiction. Later, however, I will argue that
the United States cannot juridically use this principle. 16
B. The Problem of Universal Jurisdiction
One of the most serious problems associated with universal jurisdic-
tion is that it may interfere with the juridical or political situation of a
state. Because of America's prior support of some of Hussein's criminal
actions, the United States is itself subject to juridical questions regarding
its complicity and participation in the development of Hussein's plans, for
example, during the Iran-Iraq War.' 17 Moreover, regarding the gravity of
the crimes that have been committed by the Hussein regime in violation of
international criminal conventions, 118 the international community has
juridical priority over the Hussein trial. There are two essential reasons for
this-Hussein's mass murders and the systematic violations of the conven-
tional body of international criminal law. 119 Thus, an argument can be
made for both universal jurisdiction and international criminal jurisdic-
tion, which was created to deal precisely with the types of crimes of which
Hussein has been accused.
Consequently, one of the problems of the principle of universal juris-
diction in relation to certain grave violations of the system of international
114. See Luis Benavides, The Universal Jurisdiction Principle: Nature and Scope, 1
ANuARIo MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 19, 31 (2001).
115. MALEKIAN, supra note 13, at 527-28.
116. See infra Part VI.B.
117. See generally ADAM TAROCK, THE SUPERPOWERS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR (1998).
118. Id.
119. Consider, for example, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Pro-
tocols of 1977, which concerned the regulations that must be respected by belligerent
states during an international armed conflict.
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criminal law is that, in the application of the principle of universality, the
forum state may influence the final decisions of a tribunal and therefore
violate the principles of justice regarding the prosecution and punishment
of notorious criminals at an international level. 1 20 Thus, universal juris-
diction may violate the territorial integrity or the juridical and sovereign
independence of any state. 12 1 A state may apply it for the purpose of self-
help. 12 2 Further, the use of universal jurisdiction will not be admissible
internationally unless the United States has proven that it did not partici-
pate in the commissions of some of those crimes charged. Finally, univer-
sal jurisdiction presents two additional problems. First, it may be utilized
by several states concurrently, each acting in their own self interest. Sec-
ond, it may preclude cooperation and accommodation among states when
trying a person before an international criminal court.
The above problems may not be faced if the principle of international
tribunality of jurisdiction were implemented. 1 23 The basic philosophy
behind this argument is that in the application of the above principle, the
international legal community must respect certain other recognized prin-
ciples of general international law such as the principle of impartiality of
judges and prosecutors. Obviously, the full implementation of the above
principles will be very difficult in the case of the application of universal
jurisdiction under the sole authority of any state. Furthermore, the rights
of the accused may not be respected because of interests of the state, which
has power over the accused. This right may even be seriously violated by
the custody state. Clear examples include the serious violations of the
international humanitarian law of armed conflict which occurred at Abu
Ghraib Prison by the U.S. military.
Even if we recognize that the principle of universal jurisdiction in the
case of Saddam Hussein would be accepted in the narrow or wider perspec-
tive of the definition of the principle, there remains the fulfillment of other
120. The following is a clear example. Karl Adolf Eichmann hid for approximately
four years in Germany. He eventually fled to Argentina. In 1960, he was kidnapped
from Argentina and brought to Israel where he was charged by a criminal court in Jeru-
salem, applying universal jurisdiction, as Eichmann was accused of grave violations of
the laws of armed conflict during the Second World War. He was found guilty on fifteen
counts of a criminal indictment against him. Obviously, the neutrality of the court
could not be guaranteed, since the Israeli government did not exist at the time of the
commission of the crimes. Eichmann was therefore prosecuted according to conveniens
principle. See Nicolaos Strapatsas, Universal Jurisdiction and the International Criminal
Court, 29 MANITOBA L.J. 1, 4 (2002); see also Baruch C. Cohen, What to do with Adolf
Eichmann's Memoirs?, JEwiSH LAW, http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/eichmanns
memiors.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
121. For the violation see Question Relating to the Case of Adolf Eichmann, S.C. Res.
138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
122. AndrewJ. Calica, Note, Self-Help Is the Best Kind: The Efficient Breach Justification
for Forcible Abduction of Terrorists, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 389 (2004).
123. For example, contrary to the practice of the United States and Israel, which com-
mit abductions and violate state sovereignty in applying the universality principle, some
states, such as South Africa, Costa Rica, and Zimbabwe refuse to exercise jurisdiction
over an abducted defendant. South Africa has stated that abduction may endanger inter-
national legal norms, considering the violations of sovereignty that abductions entail.
Id. at 409-10.
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essential conditions for the implementation of the principle. The accused's
home state will not utilize universal jurisdiction to prosecute, since it can
utilize its own territoriality and nationality principles instead of universal
jurisdiction. 124 Consequently, even if the IST Hussein in accordance with
the principle of territoriality and under a temporary governmental author-
ity, it still faces many difficulties in order to fulfill the primary conditions
for the application of the principle of territoriality. The problem of the
territoriality principle is that its scope of application is traditionally
restricted in certain situations concerning the application of the code of
crimes to heads of state with constitutional immunities. 12 5 This means
that Hussein, as the former head of state of Iraq, can neither be tried under
the territoriality principle nor under the former Iraqi criminal court.
12 6
C. The Dilemma of Prosecution
The universality principle creates extraterritorial rights for other states
to prosecute and punish the offenders who are not their own nationals and
when the crime is not, in any sense, committed under their territorial juris-
diction. 12 7 In other words, the principle of universality applies mostly in
the case of accused persons who are found under the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the arresting state or the high seas.128 In the case of Hussein, the
United States arrested him in his own home state. Particularly, the United
States has accepted the power of the Iraqi Governing Council over Hussein,
which means that there is no claim of universal jurisdiction.
Yet, a glance at the categories of crimes committed under the political
and juridical authority of Hussein demonstrate that a great many of those
crimes were against the State of Iran, during the ten years monopolized
war.12 9 These crimes included genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, unlawful use of weapons, torture, and crimes against cultural
heritage and property. 130 This means that Iran could have jurisdiction
over Hussein. But here again, the political reality of the case demonstrates
that justice cannot be done properly, even in Iran, as the Iranians are also
suspected of international crimes. 13 1 In other words, those political
124. For a good discussion of the principle of universality see Benavides, supra note
114.
125. See Qanun al-Uqubat [Criminal Code], Law No. 111 of 1969 (Iraq). This is the
former Iraqi legislation governing the application of jurisdiction over certain crimes
within its territorial jurisdiction.
126. Id.
127. Benavides, supra note 114, at 28.
128. Id. at 28, 42-45.
129. Approximately 600,000-900,000 Iranians were killed during the Iraq-Iran war
between 1980 and 1988. See Twentieth Century Atlas, Death Tolls for the Major Wars
and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century, http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm
(last visited Apr. 23, 2005). Iraq's casuality was approximately 300,000. Id.
130. The Iran-Iraq war itself, as well as the various criminal acts committed during
the war, violated many international conventions, the purpose of which was to prevent
certain acts during war or peacetime. For a discussion of the crimes committed, see
BASSIOUNI, supra note 13; MALEKIAN, supra note 13.
131. Neutrality of the judges and prosecutors is one of the fundamental principles of
justice. See Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 40, 41.
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authorities who are accused of committing international crimes within
their own or other nations are not, according to the international criminal
justice system, legitimately able to take part in the use of universal jurisdic-
tion, 132 as they are not free from prejudice. 133 The leaders of a state whose
actions are notoriously recognized in international relations of states might
influence the procedures of the tribunal, especially when dealing directly
with Hussein or Milogevit.
Another alternative for the application of universal jurisdiction could
have been to allow the Iraqi Kurds to prosecute Hussein. The Kurds suf-
fered continuously during the Hussein regime. 134 The use of chemical
weapons against the Kurdish population is one of the most serious trage-
dies facing international criminal justice. The Kuwaiti government also
has a legitimate claim against Hussein, given the invasion of their sover-
eignty during the Gulf War, and thus could exercise jurisdiction over Hus-
sein. Many other states may also claim universal jurisdiction over Hussein,
considering that his government has seriously harmed the conscience of
humanity. But the fact is that the principle of universality cannot function
as the principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction because of its
potential for a biased administration of justice.
The fact is that in analyzing universal jurisdiction, we must not forget
that in the system of international law, the principle of universality is used
in situations where the state possessing territorial jurisdiction or forum
delicti commissi is not able to arrest the criminal and bring him under its
jurisdiction. 13 5 This does not mean necessarily that the injured states are
not interested in prosecuting the offender. The principle of universal juris-
diction was therefore employed in certain cases as an auxiliary principle or
as auxiliary jurisdiction. If we accept this principle, it means that the state
which has arrested the criminal and wishes to conduct a trial, must first
offer extradition of the offender to the state of the forum delicti commissi. If
that state is not willing to prosecute the offender, the state which has the
offender in its custody has the right of jurisdiction. This is a possibility in
the prosecution of Saddam Hussein. There are several groups, including
the Kurds, the Iranians, the Kuwaitis and the Iraqis themselves, that have
an interest in prosecuting him. Since Hussein cannot be prosecuted and
punished by several criminal tribunals at the same time and since the prin-
ciple of ne bis in idem must not be ignored, the only solution would be
regional or international criminal jurisdiction over his international crimi-
nal actions.136 Several important principles of jurisdiction would be satis-
fied by the application of the principle of international tribunality of
jurisdiction. These are the principle of forum delicti commissi, the principle
132. This should be the sole inspiration of any civil or criminal justice system.
133. This includes the governments of the United States, Iran, Serbia, Israel, China,
and Russia.
134. See ALL"aN, supra note 15, at 25, 32-36, 40-45.
135. An examination of the historical evolution of the crime of piracy indicates this
fact. See MALEKIAN, supra note 13, at 500-06.
136. Article 20 of the Rome Statute concerns the principle of ne bis in idem. The
Article provides:
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of forum conveniens, the passive personality principle, the territoriality, and
the universality principle. It would no longer be important under which
principle the accused is brought to justice. However, a problem of coopera-
tive criminal tribunals operated by victimized states is that some of them
are themselves accused of committing international crimes and therefore
the principle of impartiality may not be appropriately respected in the tri-
bunal's proceedings.
D. The Principle of International Tribunality of Jurisdiction
In the last decade the principle of universality has been altered by
another emergent principle. 13 7 The principle of universality is not justified
in certain situations that are of concern to positive international crimes. 13 8
The punishment of such crimes under international criminal law and the
legal and political authority of the United Nations is much more in the
interest of the international legal community than the implementation of
universal jurisdiction by the state which has arrested the accused person.
These crimes require prosecution in an international criminal court.
139
This is what I call the principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction
over certain obligations of international criminal law called erga omnes and
jus cogens norms. The protection ofjus cogens norms is mostly a collective
duty of the international legal community. 140 The duty is supported by
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court
with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person
has been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5
for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed
under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same
conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accor-
dance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and
were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 20; see also id. art. 88.
137. Some criticize the principle of universality because it interferes other states' sov-
ereignty. See Benavides, supra note 114, at 41.
138. It is even stated that it is "a danger to international standards for a fair trail." Id.
139. It is rightly stated that "[an international criminal court would not undermine
the sovereignty of States any more than the system of universal jurisdiction, which in
practice, subjected the nationals of a State to the jurisdiction of another State without an
acceptable guarantee of a fair trial." Summary Records of the 2254th Meeting, [1992] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/442, A/CN.4/L.469, sect. C, A/CN.4/L.471,
A/CN.4/L.475 and Rev. 1.
140. As the often-quoted statement of International Court of Justice clarifies:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis
another State .... By their very nature the former are the concern of all States.
In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
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most states, which have historically voted for the international implemen-
tation of certain crimes including crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide. 141
The application of the principle of international tribunality of jurisdic-
tion can be found within the provisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
particularly, in the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC. 1 4 2 Concern-
ing the implementation and application of certain multilateral interna-
tional crimes, the important task of the aforementioned tribunals is slowly
abolishing the principle of universality. 143 The following is one of the
most significant statements of the ICTY Trail Chamber governing the
implementation of the principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction:
[I]t should be noted that the crimes which the International Tribunal has
been called upon to try are not crimes of a purely domestic nature. They are
really crimes which are universal in nature, well recognized in international
law as serious breaches of international humanitarian law, and transcending
the interest of any one State. The Trial Chamber agrees that in such circum-
stances, the sovereign rights of States cannot and should not take prece-
dence over the right of the international community to act appropriately as
they affect the whole of mankind and shock the conscience of all nations of
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3, 32 (Feb. 5)
(first emphasis added).
141. At the end of the Second World War, the victorious states attempted to prosecute
and punish those who had violated customary and conventional rules of international
criminal law governing regulations applicable to armed conflicts. The central idea was
to prosecute the perpetrators of the war in a particular international criminal tribunal
that had the power to criminalize those acts that had already been committed by the
members of Nazi Party. In order to legitimate such an international criminal tribunal,
representatives of the Soviet Union, France, the United States, and Great Britain eventu-
ally agreed upon and ratified the 1945 London Agreement. The Agreement consists of
seven articles. Article 1 states that the International Military Tribunal was created for
the trial of war criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical location. Arti-
cle 2 indicates that "[t]he constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International
Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter annexed to this Agreement, which
Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement." Accordingly, the Charter of the
Tribunal recognized three categories of international crimes; crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. The provisions of the Charter, which are consid-
ered today to be jus cogens norms and an integral part of contemporary international
criminal law, were ratified by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Rus-
sia. For a documentary collection, see generally BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNA-
TIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE (1975).
142. For example, the words of the preamble of the Rome Statute definitely point to
the application of the principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction. They clarify
that the state parties "establish an independent permanent International Criminal
Court in relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole." The next subsection
emphasizes that "the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall
be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." Further, the ICC is "to guarantee
lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice." Rome Statute, supra note
8, pmbl. (emphasis added).
143. Moreover, the application of the principle of universality is not absolute and has
traditionally been limited to the crime of piracy. In the Lotus case, Judge Moore sug-
gested the application of the universality principle is indeed exceptional and limited to
piracy. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 3
(Sept. 7).
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the world. There can therefore be no objection to an international tribunal
properly constituted trying these crimes on behalf of the international
community. 144
The purpose of the international courts has been to apply the norms
of jus cogens and the obligations of erga omnes- specifically, crimes
against peace or aggression, war crimes or grave violations of the custom-
ary or conventional law of war, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture,
slavery, and various fundamental principles and rules relating to interna-
tional humanitarian law of armed conflicts and human rights. Other rea-
sons for the use of the principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction
include the massive and systematic violations of international criminal
law, 145 the gravity of the crime and its effect on the international morality,
and the inviolability of international customary and conventional law.146
The principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction applies in situa-
tions that are too important for universal jurisdiction to be used. Clear
examples include the Milo~evit and Hussein trials. Universal jurisdiction
is inappropriate in such situations, since it represents only the limited
jurisdiction of one state over a criminal case that has come under its
authority. Moreover, only a limited number of offenses are subject to uni-
versal jurisdiction. 1 47 In contrast, the principle of international tribunality
of jurisdiction is broader than universal jurisdiction, in that it grants juris-
diction to all states collectively over a person who has committed interna-
tional crimes that endanger the maintenance of international peace,
security, and justice. By implementing the principle of international
tribunality of jurisdiction, one may take into consideration the opinions of
the international legal community as a whole.
While I do not reject the use of universal jurisdiction in international
criminal law and its implementation over certain international crimes such
as piracy, I strongly believe that the application of the principle of univer-
sality in contemporary international criminal law should be limited to cer-
tain crimes that involve violations of traditional international crimes, those
that are not as harmful as the newly internationally recognized interna-
tional crimes such as genocide, apartheid, crimes against humanity, and
different categories of war crimes. Thus, the philosophy of universality
should not override the principle of internationality of an international
crime. In other words, the principle of international tribunality of jurisdic-
tion means the application and implementation of the system of interna-
144. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Juris-
diction, 42 (Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/deci-
sion-e/100895.htm.
145. James D. Meernik & Kimi L. King, Crimes and Punishments: How the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Distinguishes Among Massive Human
Violations, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 147-59 (Sabine C. Carey &
Steven C. Poe eds., 2004).
146. Id. at 156-58.
147. Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance Containment and Resolution
of Disputes, General Course on Public International Law, 5 RECUEIL DES CoURS
D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 91 (1991).
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tional criminal law to certain international crimes under an international
criminal tribunal, by international judges and prosecutors. These crimes
are specifically selected for such jurisdiction due to the gravity of their
consequences, both in terms of international morality and the conven-
tional body of international criminal law. The principle requires the estab-
lishment of a tribunal which is legislated and guided by multilateral
conventions or positive international criminal law and human rights. Such
a tribunal is necessary in order to apply the principle of proportionality
and to maintain peace and justice.
VII. Infringement of the Rights of the Accused
Since the establishment of the United Nations, the development of the
provisions of international human rights has been one of its purposes and
aims. 148 For this reason, human rights provisions have not only been
involved in the basic structure of the Declaration of Human Rights but have
become a part of conventional international criminal law and particularly
the international law of armed conflict.149 For example, the provisions of
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 must be respected by all parties dur-
ing an armed conflict. Failure to abide by the Geneva Conventions consti-
tutes a violation of the law of armed conflict.150 Although the provisions
of these conventions are considered an integral part of international cus-
tomary and conventional law, conflicting parties have constantly disre-
garded or violated them. Examples include the following: the Vietnam
War; the Iran-Iraq War in which Iraq used chemical weapons against Ira-
nian troops and Kurdish civilians; the 1991 armed attack by the Coalition
powers against Iraq under the protection of the United Nations Security
Council resolutions; the 1991-1995 War in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia; the massive armed attack against Iraq in accordance with the
provisions of the United Nations as it is asserted by the United States start-
ing in 2003; and the occupation of the Palestinian homeland by the Israeli
military forces since the establishment of the United Nations.
Below, the article considers some of the violations of the Geneva Con-
ventions committed by the United States in Iraq, as well as the future
effects of such violations. The article will also consider the rights of the
accused before a criminal tribunal operating under the supervision of the
Coalition.
After the United States captured Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on
December 13, 2003, it stated that Hussein was a prisoner of war under the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions applicable in a time of armed con-
148. See U.N. Charter art. 1.
149. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 47 Stat. 2021, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
150. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field arts. 12, 18, 19, 20, 23, 36, 32, 37, 44,
50, 53, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31[herinafter
Geneva I].
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flict.' 5 l However, shortly after Hussein's capture, the Coalition power vio-
lated one of the principles of the Geneva Conventions concerning the
protection of the prisoners of war. Specifically, the violation occurred
when American military personnel distributed pictures and videos of Hus-
sein and the dead bodies of his sons, relating to the arrest and medical
examination. These activities violated, inter alia, the following:
- the principle of positive international law relating to the treatment of the
prisoners;
- the principle of customary international law concerning the protection of
the dignity of prisoners at the time of arrest;
1 5 2
- the principle of international criminal law concerning the humanitarian
law of armed conflict; 15
3
- the basic principles of the Geneva Conventions;
15 4
- the principles of the Red Cross Organization governing the protection of
prisoners of war, even after war has ended;1 5
5
- the most basic principles of international human rights concerning the
rights of accused persons to be protected against any kind of abuse by mili-
tary personnel;' 5
6
- the fundamental values of medical ethics including the Helsinki Declara-
tions of 1964;
1 5 7
- the most often respected principles of any domestic civilization.
Respect for the rights of those captured by the conflicting parties is
one of the basic principles of the Geneva Conventions. Such principles are
stated explicitly in Articles 13 and 14 of the Third Geneva Convention
Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.' 5 8 Accordingly, the state
that has accused persons in its custody must at all times respect their
151. Douglas Jehl, Hussein Given P.O.W. Status; Access Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2004, at Al.
152. Geneva Ill, supra note 149.
153. See JEAN MARIE HENCHAERTS & LOUISE DoswALD-BEcK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw (2005).
154. Geneva I, supra note 150; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tions of the Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
II]; Geneva III, supra note 149; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
155. Id.
156. See Resolution on the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
E.S.C. Res. 663C (XXIV), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (Jul.
31, 1957); E.S.C. Res. 2076 (LXII), U.N. ESCOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/
5988 (May 13, 1977); see also Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res.
45/111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/111 (Dec. 14, 1990); Body of Principles for the Protection
of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988).
157. See WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (1964), available at http://www.wma.
net/e/policy/b3.htm.
158. Geneva IV supra note 154 13-14.
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rights as contained in certain provisions applicable in time of war or peace.
Respect for such principles is considered essential to upholding the dignity
and integrity of human beings. Violation of these principles may be recog-
nized as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The example above, as
well as the instances of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, demonstrates that
the occupying powers seriously violated fundamental rights of prisoners or
accused persons. In Abu Ghraib prison, the United States Armed Forces
not only violated the international humanitarian law of armed conflict but
also many other international criminal conventions including the princi-
ples of Islamic international criminal law concerning the protections of
prisoners of war. 15 9 Thus, the Coalition Power seriously violated the
rights of many accused persons who may be brought before the Special
Tribunal for prosecution and punishment. Furthermore, it is axiomatic
that the physical and psychological effects produced by such violations
may prevent those accused from being able to freely defend themselves in
court. The following are some of the violations committed by American
and British military in Abu Ghraib prison:
- grave violations of the regulations and theories of religions; 160
159. According to Islamic international criminal law, the following principles must be
respected by the parties to the conflict when dealing with those who are captured:
1. Prisoners should not be held responsible for the cause of hostilities between
the conflicting parties.
2. Prisoners who have acted in accordance with the law of war during an armed
conflict should not be held responsible for whatsoever damages caused to the
conflicting parties.
5. The dignity and integrity of prisoners should not be disregarded.
6. Any cause of human suffering must be avoided. This includes torture and the
humiliation of prisoners.
8. The cultural attitudes of prisoners must be fully respected.
9. Females should especially be respected.
10. No person should be raped.
26. The above provisions are a duty of the conflicting parties and therefore par-
ties should not expect prisoners to be grateful for the fulfilment of such a duty.
FARHD MALEKIAN, THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 158-59
(1994).
160. For example, Islamic international criminal law considers the acts committed in
Abu Ghraib prison to be grave violations of the law of war and therefore constitute war
crimes and crimes against the Islamic humanitarian law of armed conflict. These war
crimes, some which were committed in Abu Ghraib prison, are as follows:
1) Killing women.
2) Killing mothers who have dependent infants.
3) Killing those who are incapable of fighting such as those who are handi-
capped, blind, insane, or elderly.
4) Killing minors who have not taken part in the actual fighting.
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- grave violations of the philosophy of criminal laws of different nations; 16 1
- grave violations of all instruments of international human rights in connec-
tion with the degrading and humiliating published pictures of the
prisoners;1
62
- the use of force by American and British military personnel against the
dignity and integrity of the Iraqi people;
1 6 3
- grave violations of the customary international law of armed conflicts;
1 6 4
- grave violations of the purposes and functions of the United Nations for the
promulgation and protection of international peace, security, and
justice; 16 5
- grave violations of Chapter VII of the Charter;
1 6 6
- grave violations of the soft law embodied in the General Assembly
resolutions;
5) Rape.
6) Adultery and fornication with families.
7) All types of sexual abuse.
8) Killing parents for a purpose other than self-defence.
9) Killing monks, priests, and hermits.
10) Killing a national of the enemy state who is already a resident under the
jurisdiction of another state.
11) Killing neutrals, including physicians and journalist who do not take part in
the actual fighting.
12) Mistreatment of prisoners of war.
13) Torture.
14) Excess and wickedness.
15) Degrading treatment of sick and wounded and prisoners of war.
16) Humiliation of men.
17) Treachery and perfidy.
Id. at 73.
161. For example see Sweden's Brottsbalken [BrB] [Criminal Code] 1:1, 1:2, 1:5-9,
6:1-3; Lag om kriminalvArd i anstalt (Svensk f6rfatmingssamling [SFS] 1974:203); see
also 3:1 BROTTSBALKEN: EN KOMMENTAR, DEL (1-12 KAP.): BROTrEN MOT PERSON OCH
FORMOGENHETSBROTrEN MOT PERSON OCH FOORMOGENHETSBROTrEN M.M. [Crimes against
Person and Crimes of Wealth] (Lenna Holmqvist. ed.).
162. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1971) (present-
ing the basic treaties and constitutional provisions relating to international human
rights).
163. The actions of the United States and British military personnel at Abu Ghraib
prison were, in effect, actions against the social, cultural, and religious inspiration of
Islam. In most Islamic nations, the religion of Islam not only functions as a religion, but
also represents the citizen's cultural attitudes towards certain behaviors. In fact, Islamic
law is a combination of many rules including, for example, social law, tax law, family
law, criminal law, and the law of behavior or moral law. These rules should be respected
by Moslem nations as well as by aliens who are visiting the theological community of
Islam. See MALEKIAN, supra note 159, at 157.
164. See HENCHAERTS & DoswALo-BEcK, supra note 153.
165. See U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1.
166. See U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 39-51.
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the use of torture and the violation of conventional international criminal
law governing protection of individuals from torture and other cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment and punishment;
1 6 7
- crimes against humanity;
168
- grave violations of the consolidated rules and norms of the law of war;
16 9
- grave violations of the conventions applicable to international humanita-
rian law of armed conflicts.
170
A. The International Rights of Accused Persons
Bearing in mind the systematic infringements of the system of interna-
tional criminal law committed under American authority, discussed above,
I am forced to list some of the most important international rights of
accused persons. 17 ' There are some basic fundamental norms of proce-
dure governing the protection of accused persons that must, at all times, be
respected in the proceedings of an international criminal court. In fact, it
is the right of any accused person to protect himself during the proceed-
ings of a criminal court regarding the application of the basic principles of
human rights. 17 2 These rights must be respected in any criminal court
which deals with statutes of international crimes such as crimes against
167. Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 26,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat-one.htm; Principles on the Effective
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 55/89, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/89 (Dec. 4, 2000);
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h-cat39.htm [hereinafter CAT]; Dec-
laration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR,
30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
168. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 7.
169. Geneva III supra note 149, arts. 3, 129, 130.
170. Provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of the Torture Convention definitely constitute an
integral part of international humanitarian law of armed conflict. CAT, supra note 167,
arts. 1, 2; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRiMES AGAINST HuMANiTY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIM-
INAL LAw 321-27 (1999).
171. One of the most important rights of the accused relating to a criminal case is the
right to defend himself in person or through judicial assistance that can be obtained by
choosing a lawyer. This right has been reconfirmed in the ICTR and ICTY statutes. See
ICTY, supra note 4, art. 21; ICTR, supra note 4, art. 20. More importantly, the right of
the accused to judicial assistance starts from the time that he is interrogated, arrested,
and detained by the detainee power. However, this principle of criminal justice as well
as the system of international criminal law was seriously violated during Saddam Hus-
sein's interrogation, as well as the interrogations of other accused persons, as they did
not have access to a defense lawyer during questioning, nor when they were brought to
court on July 1, 2004. See Transcript of Saddam Proceeding, CNN.COM, July 1, 2004, http:/
/www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/07/01/saddam.transcript/index.html; Pentagon:
Saddam Not Abused, CNN.COM, June 23, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/
meast/06/23/saddam.lawyer/.
172. For the proper application of criminal procedures concerning juvenile under
Swedish national criminal law see KERSTIN NORDLOF, UNGA LAGOVERTRADARE I SoctAL,
STRAFF OCH PROCESSRATT (2005).
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peace, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, torture, and so
forth. At a minimum, some of the most important rights of accused per-
sons for international crimes arising from customary and conventional
international criminal law instruments include the following:
1 73
i) The right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him.
ii) The right of the accused to remain silent.
iii) Respect for the rights of the accused at pre-indictment stages.
iv) Accused persons shall not be kept with convicted persons and shall be
subjected to separate treatment as appropriate to their status according to
international criminal rules.
v) Accused persons should not be discriminated against on account of sex.
vi) The treatment of accused persons should not depend on their former
positions.
vii) Accused persons should not be deprived of sleep or rest.
viii) Primary living conditions must be available to accused persons.
ix) Under necessary supervision, accused persons shall be allowed to have
contact with their family and friends at regular intervals, both by correspon-
dence and in person. Further, accused persons have the right to read books
and newspapers.
173. See Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 167; Principles on the Effective
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 55/89, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/89 (Dec. 4, 2000);
Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/
111 (Dec. 14, 1990); United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
their Liberty, G.A. Res. 45/113, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990); United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures, G.A. Res. 45/110, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/45/110 (Dec. 14, 1990); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/
173 (Dec. 9, 1988); G.A. Res. 40/146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985); G.A.
Res. 40/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985); Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984); Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of
Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 37/194, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982); Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, U.N. Doc. 34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979); Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/10034
(Dec. 9, 1975); Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (May
24, 1989); Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death
Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (May 25, 1984); Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663C (XXIV), U.N. Doc. E/5988 (May
13, 1977); Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at
112; Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118; Eighth United Nations Congress on the Pre-
vention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990,
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 189.
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x) Accused persons should not be kept in a place that is harmful to their
health.
xi) The health conditions of accused persons should be respected at all
times.
xii) Based on an official certificate from a legitimate doctor, an accused per-
son has a legal right to medical treatment.
xiii) The right to food should not be ignored.
xiv) All those who are dealing with the accused persons during a criminal
tribunal should be wholly impartial toward the accused person's political,
juridical, economic, social, cultural, religious, and theoretical beliefs.
xv) The rights of the accused should not be interrupted or disregarded dur-
ing the proceedings due to certain judicial expediencies.
xvi) An accused person has a legal right to be informed immediately of the
charges against him, and the grounds for such charges, in a language that he
understands.
xvii) The accused person has a legal right to adequate facilities and time for
the preparation of his defense.
xviii) The accused person has a legal right to the assistance of legal counsel.
xix) The accused person has a legal right not to testify during the
proceedings.
xx) The accused person has a legal right to a fair proceeding and a public
hearing within a reasonable period of time.
xxi) The accused person has a right to public hearings when brought before
a criminal court. This right is granted by international norms governing the
protection of human rights. The right is based on the theory that if a tribu-
nal wants to ensure fairness, it has to hold primarily open and public hear-
ings, including publicly pronounced judgments.
xxii) An accused person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
xxiii) The accused person has the right to be present when the trial begins.
xxiv) No political officials should overlook the rights of the accused during
the proceedings of the tribunal.
xxv) The accused person has a legal right to defend himself in person or
through any other judicial assistance in accordance with his own choice.
xxvi) Since the understanding of certain international criminal law terms
may be difficult, the accused person should have access to a free interpreter.
xxvii) The accused person has the right to examine witnesses. In certain
extraordinary circumstances, the witness may be examined under oath prior
to the tribunal hearings, upon authorization by the tribunal or judges of the
tribunal.
xxviii) The accused should not be convicted for an act or omission that was
not a crime at the time it was committed or omitted according to the provi-
sions of national law or international criminal law.
xxix) Confessions obtained through coercion do not have legal or juridical
validity in the proceeding of a criminal tribunal. This principle has an
important place within conventional international criminal law.
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xxx) The threat or use of degrading and humiliating treatment against
accused persons or their families for the purpose of extracting evidence
should not be admissible in a fair and just proceeding of a national or inter-
national criminal court.
xxxi) The accused person has a right to appeal. It is very doubtful in the
case of the IST that this principle can be workable from a procedural point
of view. In the international criminal tribunals, an appeal is heard by the
Appeals Chamber of the tribunal.
xxxii) Capital punishment is prohibited. This principle has been estab-
lished in customary international criminal law and has been utilized by the
international criminal tribunals.
1. The International Right to Reject the Tribunal
Although the system of international criminal law has developed into a
practical system and has become one of the most important subjects of
international and national legislations, its scope of applicability remains
very weak. This can be examined in the contemporary situation of the
international standard of politico-juridical anatomy. The problem is very
important when one considers that many provisions of the system of inter-
national conventional law have not been adopted into the national legisla-
tion of United Nations members. For example, the United States
government was for a long time reluctant to ratify the Genocide Conven-
tion.17 4 The whole policy of the Convention was considered as an instru-
ment against the foreign policy of the United States government. 1 75 The
United States has had the same problem with the provisions of the Rome
Statute.17 6 It is very doubtful that the Rome Statute will be ratified by the
United States government in the near future.
177
Yet, the United States is not the only example of a state that does not
ratify or implement international conventions. 178 There are also other
countries in the world which do not respect the provisions of international
criminal conventions. 1 79 Examples include Chile, the Philippines, Argen-
tina, Rwanda, East Timor, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Russia, Israel, and
Iran. 180 Most of these countries, as well as many others, do not believe
174. See MALEKIAN, supra note 17, at 64; see also Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The Intent to
Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed U.S. Understanding, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 369, 369 (1984); John M. Raymond, Genocide: An Unconstitutional Human Rights
Convention?, 12 SANTA CLAA LAw. 316 (1972).
175. MALEKIAN, supra note 17, at 64.
176. Jonathan I. Charney, Comment, Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 Am.
J. INT'L L. 452, 454, 460 (1999).
177. Id. The United States has, on many occasions, refused to ratify the Rome
Statute.
178. Id.
179. One hundred and twenty states signed the Rome Statute. Seven states voted
against the treaty and twenty-one states abstained. The United States, Israel, People's
Republic of China, Iraq, Qatar, Libya, and Yemen all refused to sign or ratify the Statute.
On July 1, 2002, the Statute entered into force. Rome statute, supra note 8.
180. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 1996 (1996), available at http://www.
amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar96/.
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that the system of international criminal law is as effective as their own
criminal system. Further, they state that they have no legal duty to apply
the principles of international criminal law to their own conduct. The legal
questions that may arise in this connection are the following: Do interna-
tional criminal treaties create rights and obligations for all parties? Do the
provisions of certain international criminal treaties create obligations for
non-parties? Can states avoid fulfilling their international criminal obliga-
tions by reasoning that they have not included such obligations into their
national legislation?
The customary or conventional law of treaties indicates that treaty law
creates rights and obligations only for those states that enter into a treaty
and ratify it. Thus, parties to a treaty cannot force other states that are not
parties to that treaty to respect and fulfil the obligations of the treaty.
Moreover, state parties to a treaty are under conventional obligations to
adopt the provisions of the treaties into their relevant legislation and be
sure that their internal authorities implement the relevant treaty
obligations.
There are of course some exceptions to the above rules. One exception
exists for treaty provisions that can be considered a reflection of a jus
cogens norm, which creates international obligations for all states regard-
less of whether they have ratified a particular treaty. A second exception
exists when the provisions of a multilateral treaty that has been ratified by
a state has not been adopted into the internal legislation of the state. This
can occur when a treaty provision conflicts with a cultural norm, or when
the internal political party has changed and consequently the new political
power does not adopt those international criminal provisions into its inter-
nal legislation. A clear example is the criminal law of Iraq, which has no
explicit provisions concerning the international crime of genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity. 18 1 Rather, the criminal legislation
explicitly and implicitly permits the commission of those crimes, although
they can be against the international criminal obligations of the relevant
state.
The Statute of the IST was passed by the Iraqi Governing Council,
which received temporary legislative authority for the establishment of the
Tribunal. The Tribunal is a combination of the former criminal policy of
Iraq and the present legislation of the Iraqi Governing Council and the
Coalition Provisional Authority. Thus, the Iraqi Governing Council has
adopted certain international criminal provisions into the Statute of the
IST that were never part of the former Iraqi Criminal Code. 182 Given this,
Hussein can challenge the IST by claiming that it relies upon ex post facto
laws.' 8 3 To avoid this problem, an international tribunal could be estab-
lished. Using an international tribunal would make the punishment of
181. See Qanun al-Uqubat [Criminal Code], Law No. 111 of 1969. This is the former
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Hussein less difficult, when one considers the massive criminality, system-
atic violations, and gravity of international crimes that were committed
during his presidency. But we have to be vigilant not to violate the legal
harmony of the system of international criminal law with the daily political
considerations of the superpowers' politics. Concerning certain consoli-
dated international crimes such as crimes against humanity, the system of
international criminal law should be applied solely on the basis of the prin-
ciple of international tribunality of jurisdiction.18 4 This will avoid any kind
of difficulty relating to certain important questions of justice and jurisdic-
tion over the accused.
2. The International Right to Object to Capital Punishment
Capital punishment for international crimes is prohibited under the
statutes of the international criminal tribunals.1 8 5 Thus, if a national tri-
bunal, such as the IST, is conducting a trial in which certain international
crimes are alleged, the tribunal should not apply capital punishment.1 8 6
This argument is based on the principles of consistency and legality.18 7 A
tribunal dealing with international crimes, such as crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, and genocide, is juridically required to follow international
procedures and international punishments that are foreseen for the com-
mission of those crimes and in accordance with the contemporary prac-
tices of international tribunals. Therefore, a person accused of committing
certain international crimes has an international right to receive the pro-
scribed punishment that is normally imposed by international tribunals
for similar international crimes. l8 8
The ICTY, among other international tribunals, forbids the applica-
tion of the death penalty. The statute of the Tribunal does not encourage or
permit the implementation of capital punishment at the international
level. i8 9 The philosophy behind the abolition of the capital punishment in
184. See supra Part VI.D.
185. See Rome statute, supra note 8, art. 77.
186. WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
235-58 (3d ed. 2002).
187. Further, when applying international criminal law provisions, one must not only
apply the relevant provisions in their entirety, but also follow the development of inter-
national proceedings in order to appropriately implement the system.
188. J.C. Nemitz, Sentencing in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribu-
nals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION
OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Ihorst Fischer et al., eds., 2001); Allison Marston
Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87
VA. L. REV. 415 (2001); William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A
Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 461 (1997); see also JOHN E. ECK-
ERMAN & EUGENE O'SULLIVAN, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2000); CHRISTOPH JOHANNES MARIA SAFFERLING,
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001).
189. This prohibition is clearly stated in the ICTY Statute, Article 24, concerning
penalties. It states: "[tlhe penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to
imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall
have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the
former Yugoslavia." ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 24.
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international criminal law emanates from the fact that capital punishment
in the system of international human rights is considered an act against the
integrity of human nature and is therefore strongly condemned, and
should not be implemented in a national or international system. 190 The
Rome Statute also deals with the question of penalties for those who have
violated the system of international criminal law and are brought before the
jurisdiction of the Court. The Statute clearly states that penalties includ-
ing imprisonment should not exceed a maximum of thirty years. Thus, the
ICC is not permitted to apply capital punishment to convicted persons. 19 1
Consequently, the legislation governing capital punishment under
Iraqi national criminal law and entered tacitly into the IST is analogous to
life imprisonment in international criminal law, and can be seen as cruel,
immoral, and unusual punishment compared with the practice of interna-
tional criminal courts concerning similar cases. Even though the policy of
most international criminal conventions concerning punishment is not
clarified in their absolute form of application, it is a fact and a consolidated
principle of the system of international criminal law that punishment poli-
cies must be implemented with due regard to the evolution and develop-
ment of international human rights instruments and the practice of
international criminal courts. For example, there has not been a single
case in the ICTY that has permitted the implementation of capital
punishment.
VIII. The Legal and Political Effect of the Hussein Trial
A. Political Arguments
The Hussein trial, conducted under the supervision of the United
States government and its military forces in Iraq, is one of the most contro-
versial trials in the history of mankind for the prosecution and punishment
of a head of state. 192 Consequently, it has created the most serious ques-
tion of international criminal law concerning the application of interna-
tional criminal justice that can be accepted in the juridical and political
relations of states. Due to this important situation, the whole structure of
the IST has been subject to serious international criminal inquiries that
cannot be ignored in the system of law in general and in the system of
international law in particular. One of the primary reasons for this situa-
tion is the double morality of different governments regarding the applica-
tion and non-application of international criminal law under certain
190. See generally ScH"Aa, supra note 186 (discussing the abolition of capital punish-
ment in various treaties).
191. Article 77 of the International Criminal Court concerning the application of
penalties states "(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not
exceed a maximum of 30 years; or (b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person."
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 77. *
192. As Ghoshray states, "the outcome of the trial is a foregone conclusion, only to be
remembered as a regressive legal event in the development of International Criminal
Law." Ghoshray, supra note 18, at 14.
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conditions. For example, the ICC Statute, the IST, and Security Council
Resolutions 1422 and 1487 reflect different interpretations of the system of
justice. 193
Obviously, with the application of international criminal justice, we
do not mean its application by one means or another only, but its appropri-
ate and correct implementation toward persons having been accused of
committing international crimes. This is because, as discussed above, jus-
tice is not necessarily the implementation of the provisions of international
criminal conventions or the provisions of the statute of a tribunal, but the
way in which we reach the high level of its acceptance in international rela-
tions among states. Concerning the Hussein trial, the problem of defining
international criminal justice becomes more sensitive and serious when we
look back and see the way in which Hussein received political and juridical
authority under the supervision of the United States government. The
question becomes even more complicated when one examines the history
of the resolutions of the Security Council governing the political situation
of the Iraqi government and the willingness of different super-military
states to convince others about the development of chemical weapons in
Iraq.194 Therefore, the statute of the IST makes the true application of
international criminal law very difficult and problematic in the scale of
international criminal justice. 195 Thus, the Statute of the IST cannot be
193. Both Resolutions 1422 and 1487 provide immunity from ICC investigation or
prosecution to citizens of states that have not ratified the Rome Statute, when those
individuals are involved in United Nations authorized operations. Amnesty Interna-
tional, the European Commission Legal Service, and many other groups which support
the ICC state that the agreements that the United States has concluded with other states
are not consistent with the words of Article 98 of the Rome Statute. Accordingly, it was
argued that Resolutions 1422 and 1487 violate the Rome Statute. This controversy was
resolved by a decision of the European Union ministers in October 2002. The Council
of the European Union adopted a common position which permits member states to
enter into Article 98 arrangements with the government of the United States. The
arrangement applies only to U.S. military personnel, U.S. diplomatic including consular
officials, and persons extradited by the U.S. with their permission. Accordingly, the
arrangements do not grant the general protection to U.S. nationals that the U.S. govern-
ment had sought. The European Union further stated in the common position that any
person protected from criminal investigation and prosecution under the ICC by such
arrangements would have to be tried by the United States. See Labor Law Talk, definition
of International Criminal Court in Encyclopedia, http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/
InternationalCriminalCourt (last visited Nov. 8, 2005); Amnesty International, US
Threats to the International Criminal Court, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/icc-US-
threats-eng (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
194. However, the waging of an intensive war within Iraq proved that the Coalition
power, with its strong military development under the supervision of the United States
and Great Britain, has found nothing supporting their propaganda machinery during at
least the last fourteen years.
195. Of course, it will not be so easy to decide what constitutes the most favorable
interpretation and expression of the principle of legality in the system of international
law. I believe that the principles of justice should be chosen and decided under certain
international conditions that are workable and suitable to the administration of justice.
This is much more significant in the case of administration of international criminal
justice, which has a very important role to play in the maintenance of international legal
order and peace. One of the important aspects of the principle of de lege lata is to see
whether it incorporates those commonly shared presumptions of justice as presented by
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considered similar to other international tribunals that have been estab-
lished to try individuals or heads of state for their criminal conduct. Inter-
national criminal justice cannot properly function when those accused of
criminal acts cannot express themselves freely, given the monopolization
of the national criminal justice system by the occupying power.
But what is meant by "equal justice"? Is "equal justice" the prosecu-
tion and punishment of the loser or the weaker parties alone? Or is it the
prosecution and punishment of all individuals who have, in one way or
another, participated in the commission of international crimes? 196 This
includes those who have participated in and worked with Hussein outside
the territorial jurisdiction of Iraq. 197 A proper answer to these questions
may conflict with the questions of justice presented by the strong political
parties in the Hussein trail and might not be welcomed into the structure of
the international criminal justice system as represented by the permanent
members of the Security Council in the United Nations. 198 It may not even
be welcomed into the structure of the international criminal justice system,
as represented by the ICC, t 99 as the diplomacy of the court depends on the
the principle of legality. The shared principles of equality may simply be entered into
the principle of legality but they may practically be interpreted in a very narrow way.
The aim of the commonly shared principles of international criminal law is to establish
acceptable principles of justice. This is why states enter into international criminal con-
ventions. The philosophical idea is to create a unique set of criminal principles accept-
able to all nations. The conventions of international criminal law are supposed to apply
to all injustices and inequalities based on the principle of legality or de lege lata. Inter-
national criminal justice has to satisfy the row between the mind and reality. Without
doubt, the idea of international criminal justice should not be restricted and limited to
specific groups, states, or individuals in the international legal community. But, of
course, reality is different. A permanent member of the Security Council can give effect
to many unsolved questions of international law. The Council can especially take deci-
sions concerning the questions of international criminal law-the character of which
denote a breach of peace, threat to peace, or acts of aggression. Thus, a powerful nation
under its political independence can interpret the original purpose of the system of inter-
national criminal law. This interpretation gives a temporary definition to the principle
of de lege lata and justice. The interpretation basically consists of political, economic,
and military interests of the state claiming to express the words of justice or the concept
of rightness and fairness. The expression scarcely has a negative effect on the interests
of the state itself. See U.N. Charter art. 7; see also Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security
Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996); Thomas M. Franc, The "Power of Appreciation": Who
Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992); Keith Harper,
Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Competence to Act as Court and Legisla-
ture?, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 103 (1994). Schachter correctly states that:
[Ilt had [become] evident to international lawyers as it had to others that States
that made and applied law were not governed by morality or 'natural reason';
they acted for reasons of power and interest. It followed that law could only be
ascertained and determined through the actual methods used by the States to
give effect to their 'political wills'.
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 36 (1991).
196. RAMSEY CLARK, WAR CRIMES: A REPORT ON UNITED STATES WAR CRIMES AGAINST




199. Charney, supra note 177, at 459 ("A particularly instructive case is that of Iraq,
whose citizens remain unaccused despite strong Security Council involvement, the
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will of the Security Council, which determines whether it will consider an
important question of international criminal justice. 20 0
The question is even more complicated when one or several of the per-
manent members of the Security Council are involved in the preparation,
participation in, or commitment of certain international crimes. Thus,
while the concept of international criminal responsibility may exist for the
criminal actions of certain highly protected individuals of all states regard-
less of their political, military, and economic situations, the laws are not
enforceable for certain reasons. 20 1 For example, in the IST, Hussein has no
right to express his history of juridical and political power as in an interna-
tional criminal tribunal those actions are guided and directed under the
supervision of the United Nations by international judges. While it seems
clear that the system of international criminal responsibility is an integral
part of the international criminal justice system, it may not be incorrect to
say that both systems have been divided into separated jurisdictional
issues. The consequence of this is that the difficult questions of interna-
tional criminal law such as the question of appropriate implementation of
international criminal law in an appropriate international criminal tribu-
nal is still one of the serious problems of international criminal law. Of
course, the significant question is not the constitution of the ICC but the
prevention, elimination, abolition, and abandonment of international
crimes as well as the implementation of international criminal law to every
individual who has committed international crimes, regardless of
nationality.
B. Legal Arguments
There are many reasons why the Saddam Hussein Trial might be criti-
cized under the system of international criminal law. While an exhaustive
list is impossible, the following is a representative sample of the legal argu-
ments relating to the trial:
active use of force against that country and the rather clear violations of international
criminal law.").
200. Id. ("Because international crimes almost always occur in a political context, one
cannot be certain whether the creation of the ICC was a 'feel good' agreement or a genu-
ine commitment by states to support international prosecutions of such crimes in rela-
tive independence from the political context.").
201. Take for example, the case of Ariel Sharon. When we talk about Sharon's inter-
national criminal responsibility for his criminal actions within the occupied territories,
we not only base our judgments on the principles of de lege lata and nullum crimen sine
lege, but also on the principle of application of equal international criminal justice to
anyone who violates the constructive elements of international criminal law. Sharon
committed genocide against Palestinians and Lebanese at the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps in 1982. The Belgian authorities attempted to indict Sharon for his criminal acts,
but U.S. President George W. Bush requested the Belgian government to terminate its
prosecution of the case in 2003. See Nicholas Blanford, Sharon May Be Off Hook as
Belgium Revisits Law, DAILY STAR (Leb.), July 14, 2003, available at http://lebanonwire.
com/0307/03071417DS.asp; Francis A. Boyle, Barak Appoints War Criminal Yaron,
http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/doc/boyle2.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2005).
Cornell International Law Journal
1) The Tribunal's statute was not drafted by a group of international lawyers
chosen under the authority and supervisions of the United Nations, but
rather exclusively by lawyers chosen by the United States government.
2) Given that the newly formed Iraqi government has no independent politi-
cal or legal character, especially governing certain serious questions of law,
politics, and economics, the juridical effect of the Tribunal diminishes
automatically.
3) The Statute of the IST does not coincide with the United Nations Charter.
4) Unlike international tribunals such as the ICTY, the Tribunal cannot
function as an independent national or international criminal court having
freedom of action regarding different judicial, historical, and political
questions.
20 2
5) The Tribunal's ability to employ certain principles of justice is limited by
procedure.
6) The proceedings of the Tribunal are at all times subject to the will of the
occupying power.
7) Since Saddam Hussein is the most important subject of the tribunal, and
since the Tribunal is mostly established to exercise its jurisdiction over him,
the function and the significance of the Tribunal reduces its juridical effect.
8) The judges of the Tribunal are not elected in accordance with interna-
tional norms, as is done in the ICTY, but rather chosen by the occupying
power.
9) The judges of the Tribunal have far less experience, as compared to the
ICTY or ICTR judges, regarding criminal cases involving serious human
rights violations.
10) Since the judges of the Tribunal are chosen by the Iraqi Governing
Council, which lacks power to pass legislation, the power of all judges
remains a question of politics and policies of the occupying power and
authority within the territorial jurisdiction of another state. 20 3
11) Given that the Tribunal judges have been trained in London by the occu-
pying power,20 4 they are likely to have difficulty being impartial.
12) Since the former Iraqi government is known to have seized power with
the political assistance of the United States, the Tribunal cannot open any
discussions that could divulge secret international political facts that may
harm the position of the occupying power.
202. G.A. Res. 40/146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985); G.A. Res. 40/32,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985).
203. The Coalition Provisional Authority appointed the Iraqi Governing Council. The
Council's power as well as that of the Tribunal comes from United States Ambassador
Bremer who gave the Council legislative authority for the purpose of creation of the
Tribunal. This authority was given when the Council lacked the power to adopt legisla-
tion. See Ryan]. Liebl, Rule of Law in Postwar Iraq: From Saddam Hussein to the American
Soldiers Involved in the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs Whose Actions?, 28
HAMLINE L. REv. 91, 95-106 (2005); Somini Sengupta & John F. Burns, Much at Stake in
an Iraq Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at Al.
204. See Faye Bowers, War-Crimes Trials Gear up in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Feb. 23, 2005, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/iraq/
2005/0223trialsgearup.htm.
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13) The cases that will come before the Tribunal are selective and not
exhaustive.
14) The limitations on the presentations of different cases because of politi-
cal concerns will affect the Hussein case and that of others accused of inter-
national crimes.
15) Because of bias, the Tribunal will be unable to consider those eviden-
tiary rules that are supposed to control decisions of the court.
16) The judges and the Tribunal as a whole cannot, in any way, guarantee
the just outcome of the monopolized court.
17) The principles of international human rights cannot appropriately be
respected in a Tribunal that exclusively follows the rules of the victorious
state.
18) The rights of the accused recognized by general principles of law are not
free from political ties and therefore cannot function under the proceedings
of the forum.
19) The Tribunal prosecutors are not free from monopolization by the victo-
rious states, especially the United States.
The list above is not exhaustive and can be extended further. Many of
these problems stem from the presence of political and juridical monopoli-
zation. By "monopolization," I mean the rule of strong military and politi-
cal powers. Ultimately, there cannot be a free Tribunal if it is supervised by
strong states, as the concept of justice is fairness and rightness and wher-
ever we cannot fulfil this elementary requirement of justice, we have failed
to exercise the essence of justice in international criminal law. In present-
ing here these contrasts between the principles of international criminal
law and the way in which international criminal law is implemented under
the authority of one of the permanent members of the United Nations, I
have had in mind the general idea of justice as is understood by any per-
son. Naturally, none of us wants justice that exists solely for the satisfac-
tion of strong political powers. We are seeking international criminal
justice, not for the satisfaction of unequal international treaties, but for the
implementation of the first contract of social order-no crime without pun-
ishment and no jurisdiction without proper implementation of justice.
Conclusion
In a criminal tribunal, we seek to complete and understand the rela-
tionship between the accused person and the crime in order to find out
whether the person who has been brought before the tribunal has violated
the codes of criminal law. The philosophy of justice in international crimi-
nal law is thus to protect the rights of international society, the victim, and
the accused. This is done in order to avoid any discrimination among indi-
viduals before the law and to secure the principle of impartiality.
The framework of international criminal law does not necessarily pre-
sent international criminal justice but international criminal jurisdiction
must surely, if its foundation is true, present a fair and acceptable criminal
justice system. In other words, the term "international criminal justice" is
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not synonymous with the term "international criminal law" or the term
"international criminal jurisdiction." While each term has its own defini-
tion, their main task is to implement the standard of international criminal
legislation. Clearly, none of the parts of international criminal law can
function without the presence of the others-they are an integral part of
each other and aim at the same goal. However, they can be monopolized
by different states depending on the cases which have been brought before
the criminal justice system. This is why international criminal justice or
international criminal tribunals have been called "victorious jurisdiction
and justice," as is repeatedly stated in the case of the IST.
By the same token, we have analyzed the philosophy of justice in gen-
eral and the philosophy of international criminal justice in particular. We
have come to the conclusion that the IST does not create peace, reciprocity,
equality, and international criminal justice for which the permanent mem-
bers of the United Nations, namely the United States, is politically and
juridically responsible in its equal implementation under the system of the
Security Council of the United Nations. The reasons for this dissatisfac-
tion have been numerous. The discussion not only involves whether the
Statute of the Special Tribunal is legitimate under international criminal
law, but also its monopolization by the occupying power. The fact is that
the United States government has intentionally handed over Saddam to a
national criminal tribunal for criminal investigation and punishment. It is,
at the very least, curious that he is not being tried in an international crim-
inal tribunal, given that such tribunals have been established in several
similar situations already. The problem with the newly invented Tribunal
is not just its juridical body, but also its effect and its implicit or explicit
ignorance of the Rome Statute, including its prohibition on capital
punishment.
Above all, the emerging dynamics of the system of international crimi-
nal law, due to the development of international criminal tribunals, is
based on the newly exercised principle of international criminal law-
namely the principle of international tribunality of jurisdiction, which
encourages the prosecution and punishment of Hussein in an international
court. The principle is implemented over those who are accused of com-
mitting certain international crimes at an international level. The princi-
ple is slowly abolishing many aspects of universal jurisdiction, but is
simultaneously aiming in a much more sophisticated way at implementing
the principle of internationality under absolute jurisdiction of the interna-
tional criminal tribunals. This is a form of globalization of international
criminal justice. The newly customary norm of international criminal law
has developed in accordance with the laws of international criminal tribu-
nals, the practice of the United Nations and its resolutions, the interna-
tional criminal conventions, the resolutions and statements of the
international institutions for the protection of human rights, and the opin-
ions of highly recognized international publicists. The purpose of the prin-
ciple is to prevent and hinder the type of shortcomings and
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monopolization of international criminal law on a national level that have
been seen in the IST.
The problems associated with the IST are not the first that has been
faced concerning the implementation of the system of international crimi-
nal law. The IST is not the start or the end of this monopolization of inter-
national criminal law under the United Nations Charter. On the one hand,
we must remember that the monopolization of those important issues of
international law is strongly criticized by most members of the United
Nations. On the other hand, we must not forget that the United Nations
Charter is itself the chief reason for these unbiased developments of the
system of international criminal law. Although the IST will be conducted
under the supervision of the Iraqi Governing Council and the authority of
the United States, United Nations Security Council Resolutions have also
played a role in the development of monopolized rules of international
criminal justice. In other words, recognition of the policy of the United
States government, right or wrong, does not help the issues of international
criminal law and justice, but certainly opens our eyes to what can happen
when the international legal order is based on unequal footing. Conse-
quently, the IST will not be the last mistake of international criminal law.
This will happen again and again, as long as we are teaching in our own
universities the basic function of international criminal law on unequal
norms of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, the question is
how to establish security, equality, peace, and justice when there is a per-
sisting absence of common values, common consent, mutual tolerance,
reciprocal understanding of international problems, and, above all, an
intentional misunderstanding of the integration of national, regional, and
international legal systems by lawyers, entities, and governments into a
pure global juridical mechanism.

